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Aggressive regulation to eliminate threats to health and safety began
shortly after the dawn of the twentieth century in the United States, but did
not hit its stride for another fifty years. Spurred by the political and cultural
changes that the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War provoked,'
Congress and a series of presidents dramatically expanded the regulatory
state, making the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) into a powerhouse
and, in rapid succession, creating the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). 2 Today, another forty years
later, these agencies are in shambles, in some instances suffering
catastrophic, highly publicized failures-think Vioxx (FDA) and Chinese
toys (CPSC)-and in other instances experiencing lower profile but equally
devastating systemic failures in carrying out their core missions-think
climate change (EPA) and the dearth of any new controls on workplace
exposure to toxic chemicals (OSHA).
Will Congress and the next president ride to the rescue again,
revitalizing these agencies as they near forty? Or have we passed the era of
expecting government to take action in response to complicated new threats
to people and the environment? Bipartisan political rhetoric suggests the
second outcome, with every president for the past thirty years declaring that,
as Bill Clinton famously put it, "The era of big government is over."
3
With respect, we disagree.4  We favor the resurgence of strong,
deterrence-based federal and state enforcement authorities that will focus on
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1. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
INTEREST LIBERALISM 29-30 (1986) (linking the expansion of regulatory government to the Civil
Rights and Vietnam protest movements).
2. See RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 32-33 (4th ed. 2004)
(documenting FDA's expansion and the creation of new agencies).
3. President William J. Clinton, Radio Address (Jan. 27, 1996) (transcript available at
http://www.cnn.com/ US/960 I /budget/O I -27/clinton-radio).
4. For an elaboration of these views, see generally A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A PROJECT OF THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds., 2005) [hereinafter NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA],
which sets forth a progressive agenda. We are member scholars of the Center.
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the egregious conduct that has flourished during years of regulatory neglect.
Instead of half-hearted recognition of global challenges such as climate
change and mercury contamination of seafood, which is invariably accompa-
nied by self-righteous finger-pointing at the developing world, we support
aggressive efforts to require American industry to push the envelope of
technology-based solutions, making it possible to export this progress to
other countries.
We understand that revitalization cannot simply turn the clock back to
an earlier era. Instead, efforts to revitalize the administrative state will falter
without the adoption of new approaches to the threshold problem that un-
dermines regulatory government: ineffective efforts to hold agencies ac-
countable for failure to accomplish their statutory missions. To respond to
this challenge, this Article proposes to harness the power of the World Wide
Web with a new version of an old idea: the independent development of rig-
orous and concise "positive metrics" that would give public notice when
health and safety agencies are successful in achieving their statutory missions
and when they have failed to do so.
The issue of agency accountability dates back to the 1960s when
consumer and environmental advocates were determined to prevent agency
capture by regulated interests. They reasoned that the domination of agen-
cies by corporate interests could not long survive if seats were available at
the table for the full range of affected constituencies, thereby compelling
government to operate in the sunshine. The resulting "reformation" of ad-
ministrative law, to use Richard Stewart's famous description, 5 has produced
mixed results. The United States has achieved an impressive record of regu-
latory success since the 1950s in reducing environmental, health, and safety
risks.6 Yet, as noted earlier, the regulatory ship of state is listing to starboard
in the water, unable to take bold, effective action to address pressing
problems.
As this Article will demonstrate, the procedures wrought by the
administrative law reformation have failed to ensure that agencies vigorously
and effectively achieve their statutory missions for a number of reasons. Un-
sympathetic judges have reversed or weakened some of the procedural inno-
vations that earlier courts fashioned to hold agencies accountable for
regulatory failures. Environmental and consumer-interest groups lack the
resources to fight their business opponents on every important battlefront.
Even more important, significant causes of agency failure-acute budget
shortfalls in particular-are beyond the scope of procedural accountability.
Beginning in the 1980s, a broad and energetic counterreformation
fomented by regulatory critics has also undermined the impact of the
5. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1669
(1975).
6. See NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, supra note 4, at 11-14 (describing regulatory
achievements).
1742 [Vol. 86:1741
Capture, Accountability and Regulatory Metrics
reformation. The counterreformers were similarly interested in holding
government accountable, but their motivations were in diametric contrast to
those of the sixties reformers.8 Rather than sketching the agencies' missions
in bold, broad, affirmative strokes (consider President Richard Nixon's
declaration, "The Congress, the Administration and the public all share a pro-
found commitment to the rescue of our natural environment." 9), the
counterreformers portrayed their efforts as necessary to rein in government
and control spending (consider Senator Roth's assertion, "Reinventing gov-
ernment does not mean creating a host of new programs.... If done right, it
means better government-more responsiveness at less cost-not bigger
government."10 ). Most of the procedures adopted by the counterreformers,
particularly the numerous regulatory-impact analyses requirements, operate
"below the water line" of activity that attracts any-much less consistent-
public attention. I1 A notable exception is the Government Performance and
Results Act 12 (GPRA), passed with bipartisan support and embraced by then-
newly elected President Bill Clinton. 13 This far-reaching law, which requires
agencies to compile "strategic plans" that establish goals for evaluating their
performance, is a popular subject in the public-management literature, 14 but it
has received no attention in the legal literature as an accountability
mechanism. Over the last fifteen years, GPRA has proved inadequate as a
hedge against regulatory failure-but not for the lack of paperwork.
Although agencies annually devote thousands of hours to complying with the
statute, these efforts have a surreal quality, typically failing to acknowledge
the impediments that produce the episodes of regulatory failure that have
erupted into front-page news in the last half-decade.
GPRA has failed to promote effective regulatory government because it
has a fundamental flaw: Its major goal is to ferret out waste, fraud, and abuse
7. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation:
Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 706-20 (2000) (describing the
counterreformation).
8. See generally id. at 692-720 (contrasting the two movements).
9. Special Message to the Congress About Reorganization Plans to Establish the Environmental
Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, I PUB. PAPERS 586
(July 9, 1970).
10. 139 CONG. REC. 17,974 (1993) (statement of Sen. Roth).
11. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 706-14 (noting that counterreformation initiatives such as
impact statements require agencies to get expert cost-benefit analysis prior to taking public action).
12. Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
13. Remarks on Signing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and an
Exchange with Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1310 (Aug. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Remarks on Signing
GPRA].
14. See generally, e.g., DAVID G. FREDERICKSON & H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, MEASURING
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE HOLLOW STATE (2006) (evaluating and discussing several aspects of
GPRA, including, among other things, its implementation and impact on confidence in
government).
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in government performance, 15 and agencies can expect to be punished for
such underperformance with reduced budgets. Predictably, agencies try to
protect themselves by devising euphemistic performance goals in order to
ensure that they can "pass" their own grading criteria.' 6 The upshot is a
sunny set of invented statistics designed to reassure their overseers that they
are doing fine, ending any possibility that the real causes of regulatory
failure-such as underfunding, inadequate legal authority, political
interference, or lack of bureaucratic will-can be discovered, much less
addressed.
The concept underlying GPRA-basing accountability on agency
performance-is unassailable. But performance must be measured on the
basis of positive metrics that invite a diagnosis of the real problems that pre-
vent agencies from achieving their statutory missions. The regulatory met-
rics that we propose would be designed to attract maximum public attention
to both agency successes and shortcomings. Whatever the causes of regula-
tory failure, positive metrics should produce early warnings and motivate
searches for potential solutions.
Our proposal differs from GPRA in another fundamental way. While
the elaborate paperwork that GRPA has generated is easy to recover from the
World Wide Web, one has to be an involved party or, at the very least, a
political-science or public-management graduate student to get any
satisfaction out of reading these arcane narratives. Both the content and
context of these documents represent the essence of "inside baseball,"
making them unintelligible even to public interest advocates whose job it is
to track such developments. By comparison, a system of positive metrics
would be sufficiently concise, accessible, independent, and objective such
that the metrics would become a topic of interest to both regulatory insiders
and outsiders, including the media and the public.
We do not underestimate the challenge of boiling down the existing
morass of information about agency performance and propose merely to
begin the process of accomplishing that goal in this Article. We also wish to
stress the distinction between identifying regulatory gaps and failures and
actually addressing the causes of these problems. It will take a sea change in
attitudes toward government for the spirit and not just the letter of positive
metrics to work as it should. Nevertheless, this Article will explain why the
use of positive metrics has a realistic chance of jump-starting a political dy-
namic that would make it possible to root out the causes of regulatory failure
and act to correct those deficiencies.
The first Part of this Article is focused on "procedural accountability."
It describes the administrative procedures adopted in the 1960s and 1970s to
15. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 § 2.
16. See, e.g., infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text (discussing how EPA's self-assessment
completely ignored a major shortcoming of the agency: its inadequate funding of Superfund
projects).
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address regulatory capture and explains why they have not prevented
regulatory failure. The second Part examines "performance accountability,"
comparing GPRA in theory and practice. The third Part endorses the concept
of performance accountability and proposes an alternative method of
achieving it. We recommend criteria for positive metrics and demonstrate
how positive metrics would work, using an example drawn from the Clean
Water Act. The final Part discusses how positive metrics can jump-start a
political process that would address the real reasons for regulatory failure.
I. Procedural Accountability
Ralph Nader and other sixties activists shared with their Progressive Era
and New Deal predecessors the faith that effective government was neces-
sary to regulate corporate behavior that threatened people and the
environment, but they were not prepared to trust the regulators.' 7 They were
particularly worried that regulated industries would blunt reforms by
"capturing" the bureaucracy.18 This concern was based in part on a series of
reports published at the time by Nader and teams of young investigators
("Nader's Raiders") documenting the overly cozy relationships between
regulators and the regulated as the primary reason for the faltering perform-
ance of older regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission. 19
Nader and his allies also had considerable confidence in their ability to serve
as watchdogs for agency capture, so long as they were ensured a seat at the
table where any significant decision was made and had the right to appeal
unfavorable decisions to the generally liberal judges on the federal bench at
the time.2°
Three developments have thwarted this vision of procedural
accountability. First, the reformers overestimated their capacity to keep track
of the burgeoning agencies. 21 This expansion of the government was the
most ambitious attempted since President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal,
and the sheer scope of the government's activities has made it difficult for
public interest groups struggling to overcome collective-action problems to
17. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 696.
18. See id at 693 ("[R]eformers attributed the failure of what regulatory programs did exist to
their 'capture' by the business community.").
19. See JAMES MARTIN, NADER: CRUSADER, SPOILER, ICON 81-84 (2002) (recounting the
optimism and ambitious reform plans of Nader and his supporters).
20. See, e.g., infra section I(A)(2) and accompanying text (explaining that while proponents of
stringent regulations initially favored hard look review, today opponents of strict regulation have
capitalized on hard look review to prevent agencies from adopting more stringent regulations that
the rulemaking record justifies).
21. See infra subpart I(B) and accompanying text (documenting the advantage of business over
public interest groups in their abilities to participate in environmental lobbying, rulemaking, and
rule commenting).
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make successful use of their own procedural model.22 Second, judges have
moderated the reformers' procedural protections by, among other things,
limiting access to the courts.2 3 Last but not least, counterreformers have suc-
cessfully imposed new burdens on rulemaking, making it more difficult for
agencies to take affirmative action.24
With the benefit of hindsight, one overriding conclusion emerges: the
sixties reformers did not pay sufficient attention to building up the capacity
of agencies to fulfill their ambitious regulatory missions. Although many
who were influenced by the environmental and consumer movements entered
the civil service during the 1960s and 1970s, including the two authors of
this Article, these movements did not give sufficient credence to the possi-
bility that a committed and responsible bureaucracy is a bulwark against
capture and, consequently, regulatory failure. Instead of building up the re-
sources available to agencies and defending their independent expertise, the
reformation focused too much on fomenting aggressive regulation and en-
forcement from without.
A. The Fraying of the Reformation
During the reformation, the courts expanded rulemaking notice
requirements, established a strong presumption that agency action and
inaction were subject to judicial review, liberalized standing requirements for
citizens' groups that sought judicial review, empowered public interest
groups to represent statutory beneficiaries in federal court, and required
agencies to have "adequate" explanations for their actions.25 For its part,
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act 26 (FOIA), the Federal
Advisory Committee Act27 (FACA), and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 196928 (NEPA), which were intended to make it difficult for agencies
to adopt industry-friendly policies behind closed doors.29
22. Cf infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text (arguing that businesses can organize much
more easily than private individuals).
23. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
25. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 694-95 (documenting these developments).
26. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).
27. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16
(2000)).
28. Pub L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f
(2000)). NEPA requires agencies to analyze and disclose to the public the potential environmental
impacts of their actions, and authorizes the courts to review agency compliance with these
requirements. Id. § 4332(2)(C). Like the open-government laws, NEPA made it easier for
environmental advocates to monitor agencies that were perceived by them to be hostile to their
interests because the agencies were excessively friendly to corporate and business interests.
29. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 695-96 (noting that open-government legislation made it
easier for public interest groups to monitor agencies they perceive as excessively friendly to
industry interests).
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Environmental and public interest groups still use the reforms generated
during the reformation to hold agencies accountable for the failure to abide
by their statutory mandates.3° Over time, however, the political mood in the
country changed, and the election of Republican presidents produced a judi-
ciary that has limited the effectiveness of many of these procedural reforms.
31
The Supreme Court has weakened the presumption that agency action is
subject to judicial review,32 defined "ripeness" in a manner that excludes
some types of agency action from appeal to the courtS,33 and made it more
difficult for public interest groups to obtain standing to challenge final
decisions.34  Lower federal courts have narrowed the open-government
provisions of FOIA and FACA.35 Although these trends have played a
significant role in undercutting judicial review as the safety net for regulatory
failure envisioned by Nader and his allies, two additional developments have
done as much to undermine procedural accountability as these other changes
combined: the courts have proven unwilling to compel agencies to act in the
absence of very specific statutory mandates and many judges have turned
30. See, e.g., New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating an EPA rule
that delisted "mercury" as a hazardous air pollutant under § 112 of the Clean Air Act without
following statutory prerequisites for such a decision). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Pragmatic
Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, art. 1, at 6-7 (2005), available at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/artl (establishing that procedural innovations have assisted public
interest groups in holding agencies accountable).
31. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 697 (arguing that the counterreformation was in full bloom
when Reagan took office and declared that "government is not the solution to our
problem... [g]overnment is the problem").
32. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (limiting judicial review of
agency decisions not to engage in enforcement actions).
33. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 738 (1998) (holding that
legal challenges to overall land-planning decisions must await the agency's issuance of a permit to
conduct specific activities).
34. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 105 (1998) (holding that the
environmental group's complaint failed the third test of standing-redressability-because the
violations had already ceased before commencement of the suit); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (holding that an environmental organization whose members had visited
an area prior to the commencement of an agency's project there, and had indefinite plans to return,
lacked standing to challenge the agency's action); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889
(1990) (holding that an affidavit offered by a member of an environmental group, claiming
occasional use of unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory on which mining activity
could occur by virtue of government action, was not sufficient to confer standing and survive a
motion for summary judgment). However, standing doctrine is in flux, as some recent Supreme
Court cases have adopted a more liberal position on standing. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127
S. Ct. 1438, 1454-55 (2007) (confemng standing because Massachusetts has a "well-founded desire
to preserve its sovereign territory"); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 187-88 (2000) (rejecting the application of Steel Co. to deny standing when a
complaint seeks penalties for actions that are ongoing at time of the complaint).
35. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena I. Steinzor, The People's Agent- Executive Branch Secrecy
and Accountability in an Age of Terrorism, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 117, 119-21 (2006)
(describing cases restricting the open-government provisions of FOIA and FACA).
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"hard look" review on its head, using it to block regulation that they believe
is too stringent.
1. Judicial Reluctance to Police Failure to Act.-Although the previous
restrictions have reduced incentives for agencies to respond to public interest
group concerns, perhaps the most telling problem is judicial reluctance to
police the failure of an agency to act. For the most part, the courts have dis-
qualified themselves from any role in solving a major problem that was given
short shrift by the sixties reformers: with growing frequency, agencies sit on
their hands, refusing to address compelling threats to health and safety.36 If
an agency rejects a petition to commence a rulemaking, the courts review the
denial under a highly deferential standard of review. 37  This deference is
probably inevitable because judges usually lack a rulemaking record to
scrutinize in this context, which deprives public interest groups of the op-
portunity to build an evidentiary case for regulatory action. If an agency fails
to respond to a rulemaking petition, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
authorizes the courts to compel an answer after an unreasonable delay,38 but
judges have been reluctant to second-guess such omissions, preferring in-
stead to defer to agency agenda-setting. 39 An agency's assertion that it has
not had time to respond becomes less convincing as the years pass, but it is
unusual for the courts to force a response before the expiration of at least
several years.40  Even when a court decides that the delay is excessive, it
typically solicits a timetable from the agency concerning when it can
respond, thereby adding additional delay.41
2. Anti-regulatory Hard Look Review.-Environmental and consumer
interest groups have not only had difficulty compelling agencies to act, but
36. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking" A Response to
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 525, 529 (1997) (offering explanations for the phenomenon
of agency inaction).
37. See, e.g., Nat'l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883
F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that while failure by an agency to promulgate a rule is subject
to judicial review, such review should be extremely limited and highly deferential); WWHT, Inc. v.
FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (contrasting the broad discretionary power that agencies
possess when deciding whether to promulgate rules with the narrow scope ofjudicial review of such
decisions).
38. The APA requires agencies to give "prompt notice" of the denial of a petition to commence
a rulemaking, accompanied by a "brief statement of the grounds for denial." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e)
(2000). The courts are authorized to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed." Id. § 706(1).
39. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 218 ("A court can know only a small fraction of
elements that must enter into an agency's process of setting its agenda and allocating its resources
among competing tasks.").
40. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 151-59 (3d Cir.
2002) (finding OSHA's nine-year delay in responding to a rulemaking request to be excessive).
41. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet
Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 834-35 (discussing and providing examples
of timetable solicitation and deadline enforcement by courts).
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they have also lost ground in defending stringent regulation when it actually
occurs. Opponents of strict regulation have been able to capitalize on hard
look review, originally conceived as a way for judges to stymie agency
adoption of weak regulations in the face of strong opposition by public inter-
est groups.42 Today, judges employ hard look review to address the possibil-
ity that agencies have adopted a more stringent regulation than the
rulemaking record justifies. Like their more liberal predecessors, today's
more conservative judges consider, often in painstaking detail, an agency's
factual predicate, its analytical methodology, and its chain of reasoning.43
Even if agencies survive such judicial review, it has played a major role in
ossifying the rulemaking process-an adverse effect unanticipated by the
1970s reformers who supported its adoption.44
3. The Impact of Counterreforms.-By the 1990s, broad coalitions of
regulated industries succeeded in persuading the White House and Congress
to implement a series of procedural initiatives that hinder affirmative
regulation. Exhibit A is Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of
proposed regulations, originally conceived by the Reagan Administration,
used by every subsequent administration, and expanded to a new level of
42. The phrase "hard look" review originated in 1970 with Judge Harold Leventhal, who
observed that a judge's supervisory function required a court to determine whether an "agency has
not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not generally engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In
a law-review article, Leventhal explained that the function of hard look review was to ensure that
agencies did not shirk their statutory responsibilities to protect the environment, particularly in cases
where the agency had to balance environmental concerns with other social and economic objectives.
Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
509, 555 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting EPA's methodology in calculating risks associated with asbestos); Int'l Union, UAW v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding fault with OSHA's logic and nsk-assessment
in promulgating a lockout regulation); Gulf S. Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701
F.2d 1137, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1983) (revisiting a Consumer Product Safety Commission ban on
urea-formaldehyde foam insulation in schools, and criticizing the agency's data collection for,
among other things, using too few rats in its cancer studies); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032,
1047-49 (8th Cir. 1975) (analyzing in detail the factual record and finding it insufficient to support
an EPA Administrator's determination that deep-bed filtration technology would be efficient in the
corn wet-milling industry).
44. See McGarity, supra note 36, at 557 ("[E]valuative substantive review can chew up agency
resources as the agencies attempt to fill rulemaking records with studies and to rebut all of the
criticisms that blunderbuss attacks produce. This inevitably reduces the agency's capacity to issue
rules, and.., effectively reduces the scope of federal regulation."). Administrative-law scholars
have debated whether hard look review also has a benefit of stimulating agencies to think more
carefully about proposed rules. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Ossification: Rethinking
Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEXAS L.
REV. 483, 486 (1997) ("[Hard look] review encourages an agency to perform more thorough
analyses than it otherwise might."). This Article is not the place to enter into this debate. We note
only that hard look review is implicated in the failure of agencies to be more effective in carrying
out their statutory missions.
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intrusiveness by the George W. Bush Administration.45 Although proponents
of OMB review contend that it operates on a neutral basis,46 the legal litera-
ture contains considerable evidence that it has the overall and significant im-
pact of reducing the stringency of proposed regulations.47  Review propo-
nents attempt to counter by pointing to examples of OMB's seeking stronger
regulation,48 but almost all of these accounts are disputed.49
OMB review is among a multiplicity of analytical requirements that the
White House and Congress have imposed, each mandate potentially requir-
ing some form of analysis before an agency can propose a regulation. 50 This
duplication and overlap has suggested to public interest advocates that skep-
tics of government regulation are more interested in "paralysis by analysis"
than actually improving decision making. 5I As one of the authors has noted
previously, this charge gains credibility from the fact that neither Congress
nor the White House, which as institutions consistently claim an overriding
interest in government efficiency, has made any real effort to consolidate the
various requirements and end the duplication and overlap that exists.52
45. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 707-08 (documenting these developments). President Bush
initially adopted the executive order on OMB review promulgated by President Clinton, but he later
extended the requirement of assessing cost and benefits to significant agency guidance documents.
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
46. See generally, e.g., John D. Graham, The Evolving Role of the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget in Regulatory Policy, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 171 (2007), available at
http://reep.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/content/short/l/2/171 (explaining the application of neutral
economic analysis to regulatory proposals).
47. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49-50, 75 (2006)
(finding that, based on interviews of top political officials at EPA during the George H.W. Bush and
Clinton Administrations, the Office of Information and Regulatory Policy (OIRA) "regularly
skew[ed] rulemaking in a deregulatory direction" and that OIRA "may [have used] cost-benefit
analysis to impose its own normative preference for deregulation"); Steven Croley, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 858-60, 877
(2003) (finding no statistical correlation between whether a rule was changed-or approved by
OIRA without change-and written submissions by various types of interest groups, but finding that
politically controversial rules are usually changed in the OMB review process, and arguing that this
contradicts the claim that OMB review is purely technocratic). See generally David M. Driesen, Is
Cost-Benefit Neutral?, 77 COLO. L. REV. 335, 354-64 (2006) (discussing how OMB sought
changes that would have reduced regulatory protections in twenty-four of twenty-five proposed
significant rules between June 2001 and July 2002, and that the remaining changes had a neutral
impact).
48. See, e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs,
and Implications, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 458
(Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) (noting instances where OMB has prompted agencies to take
action).
49. See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 47, at 365 (rebutting the claim that OMB's influence
promotes regulatory intervention).
50. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 533, 536-37 (2000) (establishing that agencies are subject to 111 potential analytical
steps before proposing a regulation).
51. See Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 626 (1996) (discussing "paralysis by analysis").
52. Shapiro, supra note 30, at 16.
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One potential solution to all of these developments, which have
undermined procedural accountability, is to curtail the duplicative analytical
requirements that have become such major impediments to affirmative regu-
latory responses to the problems mentioned at the outset of this Article.53
Another is to curtail judicial hard look review.54 While these reforms will
undoubtedly be necessary over the long term to accomplish the goal of revi-
talizing the regulatory state, positive metrics have the distinct advantage of
making the case for why such revitalization is crucial in the first place, as we
explain further in the third Part of this Article.
B. Pluralism's High Costs
Environmental and consumer activists had counted on the fact that
procedural protections guaranteeing access to the courts and information
would give agencies adequate incentives to heed their concerns. 55 That
threshold assumption was predicated on their ability to participate actively in
rulemakings across the government, despite the multiplication of agencies
that their success had produced. As it turned out, the available evidence in-
dicates that business interests have a significant resource advantage when it
comes to lobbying agencies and filing rulemaking comments.56 While this
advantage does not always translate into pro-business administrative
decisions, the superior funding of the business community appears to be
another reason why procedural accountability has failed to promote effective
regulation.
The early public-choice literature predicted that business groups would
be more successful in organizing to influence government than individual
citizens, 57 which led to a prediction that regulatory agencies would be cap-
tured by the entities that they were supposed to regulate.58 Prominent
53. For a discussion of such reforms, see NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, supra note 4, at 98-99,
which argues that Congress should simplify and reduce regulatory analysis requirements faced by
agencies.
54. See id. at 99-100 (stating that courts should defer to congressional choice when reviewing
the level of precaution in agency regulations rather than taking a hard look approach).
55. See supra text accompanying note 20.
56. See Scott R. Furlong, Businesses and the Environment: Influencing Agency Policymaking,
in BUSINESSES AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CORPORATE INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 155, 167 (Michael E. Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2007) ("Many of
these studies comment on the role of business interests and what appears to be their advantage in the
rulemaking process.").
57. See generally, e.g., Mancur Olson Jr., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 16-33 (1965) (presenting the traditional theory on group formation
and noting the difficulties encountered in small-group formation).
58. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward A More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211, 211 (1976) ("The creeping recognition that regulation seemed seldom to actually work this
way, and that it may have even engendered more resource misallocation than it cured, forced
attention to the influence [that] regulatory powers. .. could have ... on allocative efficiency.");
Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly & Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 809-12
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environmental and consumer interest groups routinely overcome collective-
action constraints. Public interest groups have been able to organize and
maintain themselves by finding sponsors, reducing the transaction costs of
reaching out to potential members, and offering tangible economic benefits
that can only be obtained by joining. 59 Their achievements also rebut the
contention that individuals respond only to the profit motive and demonstrate
that people also respond to such noneconomic incentives as solidarity and
purposive benefits, especially when led by what James Q. Wilson calls a
"skilled entrepreneur who can mobilize latent public sentiment (by revealing
a scandal or capitalizing on a crisis)., 60  Former Vice President Al Gore's
activism on global warming is an excellent recent example of this
phenomenon.61
While these factors explain the existence of and important successes of
national environmental and consumer organizations, the business commu-
nity's funding advantage most often translates into superior influence over
administrative decision making. A 1977 Senate committee report found that
large regulated parties had a significantly greater presence in agency
decision-making processes than did public interest groups and outside
parties.62 More recent evidence suggests that the situation has not changed.63
Scott Furlong's study of registrations required by the Lobbying
Disclosure Act indicates that many more business groups lobby the
Executive Branch than public interest groups.64 Examining lobbying reports
(1975) (asserting that obtaining a monopoly from a regulatory agency is a competitive activity in
which vast amounts of resources are spent by the competing finns); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) ("A central thesis of this paper is
that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
benefit.").
59. Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 390, 398 (1983).
60. James Q. Wilson, The Pohtics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 370
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). Solidarity benefits are socially derived, intangible benefits that arise
from association with other people, such as fun, status, camaraderie, or prestige. Allan J. Cigler &
Burdett A. Loomis, Introduction. The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, in INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS 1, 8 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 7th ed. 2007). Expressive or
purposive benefits are the intangible rewards someone gets from contributing to a group because of
its stated goals. Id. Moreover, some people will simply join an organization out of altruistic
motivations.
61. After his movie on climate change, An Inconvenient Truth, received an Academy Award,
Vice President Gore was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Sarah Lyall, Gore Urges Bold Moves in
Nobel Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at Al.
62. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., PRINCIPAL
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION 25 (Comm. Print
1979).
63. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation. Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 129 (1998) (finding that more recent evidence has reached "comparable
conclusions").
64. Scott R. Furlong, Exploring Interest Group Participation in Executive Branch
Policymaking, in THE INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION 282, 290-91 (Paul S. Herrnson et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2005).
1752 [Vol. 86:1741
Capture, Accountability and Regulatory Metrics
for 1996, Furlong identified registrants who indicated that they sought to
influence environmental and natural-resource issues and that they lobbied
both Congress and the Executive Branch.65 Over 94% of these registrants
were business or trade associations, while only about 3% of the registrants
were public interest groups.66 Furlong found a similar situation when he
looked at the clients of lobbying firms. Over 73% of the clients listed were
business interests as compared to about 6% who were public interest
groups.67
This dominance translates into higher rates of participation in
rulemakings. A survey of Washington-based interest groups by Furlong and
Neal Kerwin found that individual businesses participated in over twice the
number of rulemakings as other types of organizations. 68 An earlier survey
by Furlong found that business interests submitted many more comments on
proposed regulations than other interests did.69
These results are consistent with studies that examine who files
rulemaking comments. Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee, who
studied forty rules promulgated by four agencies from 1994 to 2001, found
business interests filed 57% of the comments; governmental interests filed
19% of the comments; and nonbusiness, nongovernmental interests submit-
ted 22% of the comments.70  Public-interest-group comments constituted
only 6% of the total of comments submitted by nonbusiness, nongovern-
mental interests.71 Melissa Golden, who examined comments filed on eleven
proposed regulations at three agencies, found the same business dominance.72
The dominance was greatest for the eight rules proposed by EPA and
NHTSA. Corporations, public utilities, and trade associations filed between
66.7% and 100% of the comments concerning these rules, and neither EPA
nor NHTSA received any comments from public interest groups concerning
five of the eight rules. 73  Cary Coglianese, who studied twenty-five
65. Furlong, supra note 56, at 174.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 175.
68. Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rulemaking: A
Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 361 (2005).
69. Furlong, supra note 64, at 289.
70. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest
Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133 (2006). The four agencies were
OSHA, the Employment Standards Administration (ESA), the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), and the Federal Highway Administration (FHA). Id. at 131. The study selected all rules
receiving fewer than two hundred comments but more than one comment. Id.; see infra note 80 and
accompanying text (discussing the impact of this methodological choice).
71. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 70, at 133.
72. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 250, 252 (1998). The three
agencies were EPA, NHTSA, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Id.
at 250.
73. Id. at 252-53.
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significant EPA rules promulgated under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) between 1989 and 1991, found that business interests
participated 95% of the time, national trade associations participated 80% of
the time, and citizen groups participated 12% of the time.74 Groups
representing regulated industries constituted 59% of all participants, and
groups representing environmental and citizen groups constituted 4%.75
These findings are consistent with overall disparities between the
resources available to business interests and those available to public interest
organizations in most arenas. Environmental advocacy groups have prolifer-
ated at the federal, state, and local levels and wield considerable political
power.76 Outside the environmental arena, a significantly smaller group of
consumer organizations participate in rulemakings on a regular basis at agen-
cies such as NHTSA and FDA.77 With the decline of unionization, business
interests have a greater advantage at OSHA as well.7t
Evidence that the business community has more lobbyists and
participates more frequently in filing rulemaking comments does not
establish that business interests always prevail in the administrative process.
The limited available evidence is mixed on whether such a connection exists.
Three studies have failed to find that business dominance in filing rulemak-
ing comments produces a pro-business regulatory decision.79  But Jason
Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee have found statistical evidence that
''agencies appear to alter final rules to suit the expressed desires of business
74. Croley, supra note 63, at 129 (citing Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation
and Bargaining in the Administrative Process 46-47 tbl.2-x (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Michigan)).
75. Id.
76. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS
144-45 (1999) (describing the increasingly broad and large memberships of various environmental
advocacy groups).
77. See Croley, supra note 63, at 127-29 (referencing low participation rates in the FDA
rulemaking process by public interest groups relative to large regulated parties); Golden, supra note
72, at 254 (illustrating the low level of participation by consumer organizations in NHTSA
rulemaking by comparing the number of comments submitted by consumer organizations to those
submitted by business interests).
78. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 321-22 (2005) (arguing that employers have achieved increasing freedom
to self-regulate from agencies like OSHA since the decline of the collective-bargaining system).
79. See Golden, supra note 72, at 260-61 (finding no evidence of "agency capture" in the
changes made to ten proposed rules at EPA, NHTSA, and HUD); see also WESLEY A. MAGAT ET
AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 143-
45, 157 (1986) (finding no statistically significant empirical support for the hypothesis that active
participation in federal rulemaking by firms results in weaker regulatory standards for those firms);
Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA
Decision Making, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175, 192, 194-95 (1992) (finding rulemaking input from
environmental groups on the cancellation of federal pesticide-use registration to have twice the
impact on the likelihood of cancellation as input from commercial growers).
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commenters" when there is a higher proportion of business comments
submitted during the public comment period. 8°
Regulated industries are especially likely to have disproportionate
influence when regulatory proposals are of low political salience and high
technological complexity. 81  Today's environmental, health, and safety
legislation was passed during a period (1968-1978) when Congress was
reacting to public outrage over a number of highly visible environmental and
safety disasters. 82 As the implementation of these broad mandates requires
ever more technical inquiries, their prominence in the news has declined
precipitously. Voters do not follow, let alone understand, the myriad of
policy issues decided by regulators. Because solutions depend on analyses of
complex scientific and technical information, even if public interest groups
are able to participate, they have great difficulty eliciting media attention that
would educate voters about regulatory issues. Taking advantage of the
situation, the business community and its political allies have devised a num-
ber of low-visibility tools to throw sand in the gears of regulatory
government.83
Conversely, public interest groups have more opportunity to prevail
over strong business opposition when there is a highly visible problem that
achieves prominence through the media, presenting the risk that the outcome
of the debate could influence electoral politics. 84 Two contemporary exam-
ples of this phenomenon include the strengthening of FDA authority by an
otherwise partisan and gridlocked Congress in the wake of the Vioxx and
related scandals, 85 and Congress's apparent willingness to consider analo-
gous reform of the CPSC in the wake of the Chinese toy dangers exposed in
2007.86 Unfortunately, this level of public concern is seldom generated by
80. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 70, at 135-36. The study was limited to low-saliency rules
and does not indicate whether business interests have the same disproportionate influence
concerning high-saliency rules. Id. at 137.
81. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167, 173-74 (1990)
(observing that monitoring costs influence the likelihood that agencies will act in the public
interest).
82. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 3-4 (2003).
83. See generally DAVID BOLLIER, THOMAS MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO,
SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL GAMES THAT INDUSTRIES PLAY TO SUBVERT
RESPONSIBLE REGULATION (2004) (identifying and explaining low-visibility ways the business
community has been able to subvert regulation).
84. In this situation, legislators understand that voters are likely to hold them accountable for a
failure to act. This visibility also makes it easier for a legislator's election opponent to point out
that the legislator failed to act in the constituents' best interest. See Wilson, supra note 60, at 370-
71 (describing visible scandals leading to the passage of drug and safety laws).
85. See infra subpart II(C).
86. See, e.g., CPSC Reform Act of 2007, S. 2045, 110th Cong. § 23 (2007) (reforming
prohibitions on the sale of toys containing lead); Consumer Product Safety Modernization Act, H.R.
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the daily activities of the regulatory state. When public attention-or the
threat of publicity-is unlikely, the procedural remedies installed by the
sixties reformers may be overmatched as a deterrent to capture.
Again, a major advantage of the positive metrics we propose in the third
Part of this Article is their capacity to lift the most important issues on the
health and safety agenda from the first, low-saliency category to the second,
high-visibility one. By compelling disclosure of the reality behind agency
claims regarding their efforts to solve these problems, the public (and public
interest groups) will have a better opportunity to leverage their limited re-
sources in demanding change.
C. Oversight Versus Capacity Building
The sixties reformation has languished on the shoals of unfriendly-or
at least unhelpful-judicial developments, burdens on rulemaking imposed
by the counterreformers, and greater financial capacity of business interests
to lobby agencies and file rulemaking comments. The goals of procedural
accountability have remained elusive for one more reason: Agencies lack the
financial wherewithal to fulfill the ambitious missions assigned by Congress.
This defunding of government is the product of the swing of the political
pendulum from left to right, of deficit spending, and of a steady drumbeat of
disdain for the civil service fostered by conservatives from Ronald Reagan
on down. 87 Although the sixties reformers can hardly be blamed for failing
to foresee these developments, they inadvertently prepared the ground for it
by focusing their efforts on regulatory capture and spending less time and
effort building the capacity of agencies to fulfill their statutory mandates.
Ronald Reagan was elected president only a decade after the expansion
of FDA and the creation of EPA, OSHA, NHTSA, and CPSC. He was un-
abashedly antagonistic toward government and bureaucrats.88 His brand of
conservative ideology created a negative atmosphere at the White House just
as the new agencies were beginning to flex their regulatory authority.
89
Some of the most prominent health and safety agencies were literally occu-
pied by political appointees who had well-established records opposing the
agencies' core missions.90 In this, as in so many other contexts, EPA was the
poster child for hostile takeover, freeing itself only after one of its leaders
4040, 110th Cong. § 107 (2007) (requiring CPSC to conduct a study on the effectiveness of safety
standards for toys).
87. See JOAN CLAYBROOK & THE STAFF OF PUB. CITIZEN, RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN'S
ATTACK ON AMERICA'S HEALTH, at xxii-xxv (1984) (describing the budget cuts instituted by the
Reagan Administration's deregulators).
88. See id. at xxxi (describing President Reagan's election on a platform of "getting the
government off our backs").
89. See id. at 117-19 (noting that the Reagan Administration began cutting EPA resources just
as the Agency was beginning to institute the Clean Water Act and the amended Clean Air Act).
90. See, e.g., id. at 120-21 (listing top-level EPA appointees with anti-environmental records).
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was sentenced to jail for corruption91 and another driven out of Washington
in disgrace after picking a fight over executive privilege to prove fealty to her
White House masters.92
Reagan's ridicule of officious bureaucrats gradually produced a pivot in
public opinion that continues to this day. Opinion polls show that Americans
distrust their government at the same time that they expect it to keep them
safe. 93 This cognitive disconnect has produced even harder times for regula-
tory agencies. The agencies face withering, even vicious disparagement by
members of Congress. Consider, for example, the dreary period when then
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay compared EPA to the Gestapo.94 Yet
the agencies are also blamed if they do not move full-steam ahead to achieve
their statutory mandates. Such deep-seated ambivalence has taken its toll in
myriad ways, contributing to the conditions for the widespread failure of
regulatory government that we see today.
Agencies struggle-and have always struggled-with inadequacies in
the design of regulatory legislation 95 and the unavailability of scientific and
technical information that they need to analyze and devise remedies for
threats to people and the environment.96 Government service is plagued by
the same quotient of incompetent personnel as the private sector-some
would say more. These immutable challenges would be difficult to surmount
in the best of times, but as mentioned earlier, agencies are also compelled to
labor under a growing burden of analytic requirements imposed by both the
White House and Congress.97
As onerous as these analytical requirements have become, they are not
the most damaging legacy of the Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II
91. See JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S
ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 67 (1984) (describing the perjury conviction of Rita Lavelle, an
assistant administrator and Reagan appointee).
92. See id. at 79-81 (describing how EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch invoked executive
privilege despite her belief that it had no legal basis, leading to her resignation).
93. See RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM: How POLLUTION AND HOLLOW
GOVERNMENT HURT OUR KIDS 177-78, 182-83 (2008) (discussing public-opinion polling showing
strong support for environmental protection and strong distrust of government).
94. Spencer Michels, What's Next for the EPA?, ONLINE NEwSHOUR, Dec. 21, 1995,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/epa.12-2l.html (quoting DeLay as saying, "The
critical promise we made to the American people was to get the government off their backs, and the
EPA, the gestapo of government, pure and simply has been one of the major 'clawhose' that the
government has maintained on the backs of our constituents.").
95. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 82, at 42 (explaining that Congress amended
the Clean Air Act due to EPA's inability to regulate hazardous air pollutants under a health-based
standard).
96. See JOHN S. APPLEGATE & KATHERINE BAER, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE
PAPER NO. 602, STRATEGIES FOR CLOSING THE CHEMICAL DATA GAP 1 (2006), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Closing_-DataGaps_602.pdf (pointing out a data gap
between the amount of information agencies have and the amount they require in order to justify
protective action).
97. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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Administrations. Instead, having succumbed to the temptation to make big
government their scapegoat-in-chief for much of what ails the nation, these
Administrations went one crucial step further, giving overpowering momen-
tum to the idea that "big" government is "bad" government. 98 Paradoxically,
they abandoned any real effort to repeal the elaborate regulatory mandates
established by previous presidents and Congresses.99 The practical effect
was no change in statutory workload or expectations, but sharp decreases in
agency budgets.100 Unable to fulfill their responsibilities because of a lack of
funds, regulatory agencies began to look like the rogues they were pictured to
be in conservatives' antigovernment rhetoric.0 l
One ostensible reason offered for reducing agency budgets has been to
reduce federal deficits. 10 2 This budget-cutting argument is entirely specious.
The total amount spent on the five agencies we have identified was 0.51% of
the total U.S. budget in 1990 and 0.41% in 2005.'0°
It is a small wonder, then, that the single biggest cause of regulatory
failure today is "hollow" government, meaning that agencies cannot possibly
achieve many of the mandates for which they are held accountable with the
resources provided by the White House and Congress. 104 Combined with the
98. See, e.g., Governor George W. Bush, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National
Convention (Aug. 3, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/
conventions/republican/transcripts/bush.html) (arguing that "[b]ig government is not the answer");
Clinton, supra note 3 ("The era of big government is over.").
99. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., STEINZOR, supra note 93, at 51 (presenting a graph indicating that EPA in 2004
had substantially less funding than it had in 1980 in constant dollars); Product Safety Regulator
Hobbled by Decades of Negligence, OMB WATCH, Feb. 5, 2008, at graph 1, http://www.omb
watch.org/article/articleview/4154 (indicating that CPSC currently has substantially less funding
than it had in 1977 in constant dollars).
101. See, e.g., STEINZOR, supra note 93, at 50-54 (discussing legislation in the 1980s that
greatly expanded EPA's responsibilities, despite the Agency's chronic underfumding).
102. For example, Stephen L. Johnson, EPA's current Administrator, has sought to justify a
4.4% cut proposed by the Bush Administration in the Agency's budget on the grounds that the
proposed budget "meets our environmental goals while being responsible stewards of taxpayers'
dollars." Jeff Kinney, President Proposes 4.4 Percent Budget Cut for EPA, Targets Grants for
State Projects, [2008] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) 23 (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://ehscenter.
bna.com/pic2/ehs.nsf/ id/BNAP-7BJGR2?OpenDocument.
103. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET
AUTHORITY HISTORICAL SPREADSHEET FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2008), available at http://www.white
house.gov/omb/budgetdfy2008/sheets/budauth.xls (reporting that the U.S. government allocated a
total of $6,512,188,000 for FY 1990 to the five agencies-EPA ($5.379 billion), FDA ($601
million), OSHA ($267 million), CPSC ($35 million), and NHTSA ($229 million). In FY 2005,
budgets for the agencies totaled $10,340,000,000-EPA ($7.959 billion), FDA ($1.427 billion),
OSHA ($464 million), CPSC ($62 million), and the NHTSA ($428 million)). See Government
Spending in United States 1902-2013-Federal State Local Charts, http://www.us government
spending.com/index.php#usgs302a (listing the FY 1990 total federal budget as $1,253,000,000,000
and the FY 2005 total federal budget as $2,472,000,000,000).
104. The term "hollow government" is attributed to Edward Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, who
used the phrase in the 1970s to describe the impact of insufficient funding on the nation's armed
forces. PEG MCGLINCH & PETER BARTON HUTT, HOLLOW GOVERNMENT: RESOURCE
CONSTRAINTS AND WORKLOAD EXPANSION AT FDA (2001), http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/
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historic factors of regulatory tools that do not fit the job, data gaps, and
incompetence, budget shortfalls have crippled health and safety agencies in
increasingly visible ways.
1I. Performance Accountability
The raison d'dtre of procedural accountability is to deter regulatory
capture by ensuring seats at the table for the full range of affected constituen-
cies and by requiring government in the sunshine. 105 The philosophical ori-
gin of performance accountability, by comparison, is associated with the
practices of American public administration and the academic field of public
administration. 106 "Simply put," as two public-administration scholars note,
"in the classic public administration ethos, well-managed governments will
perform well."'10 7 For public administration, the tool of choice to promote
good management is rigorous measurement of agency and program
performance. Public administrators regard GPRA as the "high-water mark"
performance measurement in the federal government.1
0 8
The concept of well-managed government, however, means different
things to different people. In contrast to the dogma of public administrators,
who associate good government with the progressive ideal of neutral and
professional management 09 and are primarily committed to "getting better or
more effective service per dollar, ' ' t 0 elected officials increasingly regard
well-managed government as a "war on waste.""' In this context, "the
emphasis.. . is economy, or simply spending less. The war-on-waste
approach to reform is associated with such popular political slogans as 'the
era of big government is over,' 'a government that works better and costs
less,' and 'it is time to stamp out fraud, waste and abuse.""' 2
GPRA reflects these dueling conceptions. According to GPRA's
statement of its mission:
742/McGlinchO I-redacted.html. The term was appropriated by the editors of Government
Executive to describe the decay of the government's capacities during the Reagan Administration.
Id. (citing Timothy B. Clark, Editor's Notebook, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, May 1999, at 4).
105. Cf supra text accompanying note 20.
106. See FREDERICKSON & FREDERICKSON, supra note 14, at I (asserting that both the practice
and the study of public administration are "uniquely associated with questions of government
performance").
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Government Performance and Results Act, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.)).
109. Id. ("For much of the twentieth century, most scholars thought that the key to improved
government performance was a politically neutral, merit-based civil service and a well-managed
government of expert public administrators.... Simply put, in the classic public administration
ethos, well-managed governments will perform well.").
110. Id. at 37.
111. Id.
112. Id.
2008] 1759
Texas Law Review
[W]aste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the
confidence of the American people in the Government and reduces
[sic] the Federal Government's ability to address adequately vital
public needs .... [The purpose of this Act is to] improve [that]
confidence... by systematically holding Federal agencies accountable
for achieving program results.
113
GPRA has generated a mind-boggling whirlwind of reassuring statistics,
cheerful narrative, and assurances that all is well at whichever regulatory
agency is justifying its performance. Probe beneath the numbers, however,
and these assurances lose their credibility. We provide two case studies to
illustrate these phenomena. The first, involving growing paralysis in EPA's
Superfund toxic-waste cleanup program, has garnered remarkably little pub-
lic attention. The second, involving FDA's failure to police the safety of
Vioxx after its approval as a new drug, was front-page news for weeks.
As these case studies will demonstrate, GPRA has failed as a result of
its own mixed messages. The statute asks agencies to indicate the constraints
under which they operate and how these constraints may affect their
performance, but agencies compelled to function in an antiregulatory, even
hostile, political atmosphere are predictably reluctant to tell the truth to
power. Instead, their goal has become convincing congressional and White
House overseers that they are performing well despite budgets that are
inadequate for effective implementation of their missions. The result is a set
of optimistic statistics designed to reassure the agency's overseers that they
are doing fine, rather than a frank discussion of the real causes of regulatory
failure.
A. GPRA's Edicts
GPRA orders all agencies to submit strategic plans covering a period of
"not less" than five years to Congress and the director of OMB.' 14 Those
plans must contain a "comprehensive mission statement," as well as general
"goals and objectives."'" 5 Agencies must explain how they intend to achieve
their goals and then describe the "human, capital, information, and other
resources" they will need to do so. 1 6 They must identify the "key factors
external to the agency and beyond its control" that could affect achievement
of their general goals and objectives." The agencies are instructed to con-
sult with Congress and also to "solicit and consider" the views of all entities
that are "potentially affected by or interested in" their plans.
1 18
113. 31 U.S.C. § 1115 note (2000).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 306 (2000).
115. Id. § 306(a)(1)-(2).
116. Id. § 306(a)(3).
117. Id. § 306(a)(5).
118. Id. § 306(d).
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Strategic plans, apparently intended to be visionary and "big picture,"
must be supplemented by "performance plans," covering each "program
activity" set forth in the agency's budget.119  Performance plans must
establish goals, expressing them in "objective, quantifiable, and measurable
form.' 120 They must identify the "indicators" agencies will use to assess
"outputs, service levels, and outcomes," and the "means" they will use to
"verify and validate measured values."'' 2 1 GPRA further requires the agen-
cies to prepare annual "program performance reports" that compare their
goals and indicators with their "actual program performance." 122 If they fail
to achieve success, they must explain why, what they intend to do about it,
and whether the goals or indicators themselves are the problem and must be
changed. 1
23
B. Toxic Waste Cleanup
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act124 (CERCLA or Superfund) established two sources of funding
to clean up the thousands of toxic-waste sites around the country: liability
and appropriations, primarily supported by industry taxes. Parties responsi-
ble for waste sites are strictly, jointly, and severally liable to either reimburse
the government for cleanup costs it incurs or to carry out cleanup orders the
government issues.125 The statute also creates a multibillion-dollar trust fund
to finance the administration of the program, enforcement actions, and feder-
ally funded cleanup. 126 Federal funding is especially important because it is
the only resource available to remediate so-called orphan sites where the
government could not find potentially responsible parties. 127 To support the
fund, Congress levied a broad-based corporate income tax, as well as
"feedstock" taxes targeted at the oil and petrochemical industries. 12  When
the statute was last reauthorized in 1986, these taxes were projected to pro-
vide approximately $1.7 billion annually, with additional appropriations from
119. 31 U.S.C. § 1115(2000).
120. Id. § 11 15(a)(2) (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 1115(a)(4), (6).
122. Id. § 1116.
123. Id. § 1116(d).
124. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2000)).
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607.
126. Id. § 9611.
127. RENA STEINZOR & MARGARET CLUNE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT: TOXIC WASTE DUMPS &
COMMUNITIES AT RISK 18 (2006), available at http://images1.americanprogress.org/il80web20037/
cap/superfund-neglect.pdf.
128. See generally id. (explaining the funding process for Superfund).
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general taxpayer revenues authorized to provide approximately $200 million
annually. 1
29
In 1995, Congress permitted the taxes supporting the trust fund to
expire, and shifted the costs of the program to general revenues. 13' The
expired taxes raised revenues of approximately $1.5 billion annually (or $4
million daily), an amount that clearly is not burdensome on industry,
amounting to approximately 1.8% of the 2006 profits of just six of the na-
tion's largest oil and petrochemical companies.131 The full impact of this
development did not become obvious immediately because millions re-
mained in the trust fund from previous years, EPA slowed the pace of
spending, and Congress appropriated more money from general revenues.
By 2001, however, the number of "construction completions" at sites on the
Superfund National Priorities List (NPL) had fallen from eighty-seven in
2000 to forty-seven; in 2007, the number had fallen to twenty-one.' 32 Figure
1 shows the trajectory of these reductions from 1992 to the present.
129. MARK REISCH, ENvT'L PROT. SECTION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUMMARIES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS ADMINISTERED BY THE EPA: SUPERFUND (2001), http://www.ncse
online.org/ NLE/CRSreports/BriefingBooks/Laws/j.cfm.
130. See generally JAMES E. MCCARTHY, RES., SCI., & INDUS. DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SUPERFUND TAXES OR GENERAL REVENUES: FUTURE FUNDING OPTIONS FOR THE SUPERFUND
PROGRAM (2005) (discussing the controversy over extending Superfund taxes).
131. Oversight Hearing on the Federal Superfund Program's Activities to Protect Public
Health: Oversight Hearing Before Subcomm. on Superfund and Envtl Health of the S. Comm. on
Env't & Pub. Works, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Rena Steinzor, Professor, University of
Maryland School of Law; Member Scholar and Board Member, Center for Progressive Reform).
132. The term "construction completion" refers to a stage in the cleanup of a site when any
necessary physical construction and engineering work is complete, even if final cleanup goals have
not been achieved. OFFICE OF ENVTL. & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA, OSWER DIRECTIVE
9320.2-09A-P, CLOSE OUT PROCEDURES FOR NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST SITES 3-1 (2000).
According to EPA, measuring success by simply looking at the ratio of deleted NPL sites to total
sites on the NPL fails to "recognize the substantial construction and reduction of risk to human
health and the environment that has occurred at NPL sites not yet eligible for deletion." Id. So, in
1990, to "communicate more clearly to the public the status of cleanup progress" among NPL sites,
EPA established the new category of "construction complete" as its main indicator of program
success. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666,
8699 (Mar. 8, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2008)).
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Figure 1: NPL Site Construction Completions 1992 to Present
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In offering these statistics, we make no claim that they are the only
important quantitative measure of EPA's Superfund performance, although it
is worth noting that the Agency itself highlighted construction completions
as an especially important metric for judging the program's performance in
1990.134 Rather, we suggest that this metric provides obvious and prominent
evidence that the program underwent profound changes at the same time that
it lost the primary source of funding Congress designed for it. Outside in-
vestigations confirm this conclusion. In 1999, Congress asked Resources for
the Future (RFF) to conduct a study of the funding requirements of the
Superfund Program. 135 The results of the study suggest that congressional
appropriations have left a funding gap of between $1.0 and $3.4 billion with
respect to the money necessary to clean up existing Superfund sites. 136 An
133. EPA, Number of NPL Site Actions and Milestones by Fiscal Year,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/nplfy.htm (last updated May 8, 2008).
134. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. at 8699.
135. KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., SUPERFUND'S FUTURE: WHAT WILL IT COST? 2-3 (2001),
available at http://www.rff.org/rff/rff-press//CustomBookPages/Superfunds-Future.cfm.
136. RFF estimated that the total cost of the Superfund program from FY 2000 through FY
2009 would be between $14 billion and $16.4 billion, in constant dollars. Id. at 156-57, 159 fig.7-
11. In 2005, Katherine Probst found that Superfund appropriations for the previous few years had
been a little less than $1.3 billion per year. Katherine N. Probst, Superfund at 25: What Remains To
Be Done, RESOURCES, Fall 2005, at 20, 21, available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-
Resources- 1 59-Superfund.pdf. Assuming that EPA had received $1.3 billion in appropriations from
FY 2000 to FY 2009, it would have received a total of $13 billion in funding. As compared to
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author of the RFF report recently observed, "Hundreds of sites across the
country have been remediated, but there's not enough money to finish work
on the sites already designated, never mind the ones that are still being
added.", 1
37
As for the larger consequences of these failures, a report for the Center
for Progressive Reform (CPR) and for the Center for American Progress
(CAP) (which was co-authored by one of the authors of this Article)
examined the impact of inadequate funding by studying five of the worst
Superfund sites in each of the ten most populous states. 38 This examination
revealed that the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL) includes 1,244
sites awaiting cleanup; many have languished on the NPL for more than two
decades. 139 The sites typically contain noxious mixtures of solid and liquid
wastes that infiltrate soil, surface water, and underground aquifers. 140 Be-
tween 205,000 and 803,000 people live within one mile of these sites,
including 34,000 children and 14,000 elderly persons; a disproportionate per-
centage of these persons are low-income and people of color.
14 1
EPA is one of the more ambitious agencies when it comes to compiling
GPRA reports. The 2006-2011 EPA Strategic Plan14 2 is a beautifully
illustrated, 180-page publication; the 667-page 2007 EPA Performance
Plan143 is less polished in presentation but considerably more elaborate. Yet
neither of these reports has anything to say about the funding challenges
facing the Superfund program. Both reports fail to mention the expiration of
Superfund's taxing authorities; the number of construction completions is
also omitted.
Instead, both reports contain statistics that are puzzling at best and
misleading at worst because they suggest the Agency is making progress
when it is not. For example, the 2006-2011 EPA Strategic Plan promises
that by 2011, the Agency will "achieve and maintain at least 95 percent of
the maximum score on readiness evaluation criteria in each region."'144 The
statement refers to EPA's ability to respond to emergencies involving haz-
ardous substances. The 95% figure is clear enough, but the report makes no
effort to explain what each region's "readiness criteria" entail. In another
RFF's estimate of the total cost of the program, this leaves a funding gap of between $1.0 billion
and $3.4 billion.
137. Probst, supra note 136, at 20.
138. STEINZOR& CLUNE, supra note 127, at 2.
139. Id. at 1.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id.
142. EPA, 2006-2011 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN: CHARTING OUR COURSE (2006) [hereinafter
EPA 2006-2011 STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/plan/2006/entire
_report.pdf.
143. EPA, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2007:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND FINANCIAL PROGRESS (2007) [hereinafter 2007 EPA PERFORMANCE PLAN],
available at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/par/2007par/parO7report.pdf.
144. EPA 2006-2011 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 142, at 67.
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section, EPA promises to "complete an additional 975 Superfund-lead
hazardous substance removal actions," noting that "[i]n FY 2005, 175 of
these actions were completed."' 145 Not only does this promise lack any objec-
tive context (how many removals are needed?) or historical context (how
many have been done in years when funding was at full strength?), but it also
lacks ambition: simple math shows that EPA expects to do 162 removal ac-
tions in each of the six fiscal years between now and 2011, a 7% drop from
the 175 done in fiscal year 2005.
C. Vioxx
In May 1999, FDA approved Vioxx "as a prescription painkiller for use,
among other things, as a treatment for the signs and symptoms of
arthritis."'146  On September 30, 2004, Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx,
withdrew the drug because studies indicated it significantly increased the risk
of heart attacks, but not before there had been $2.5 billion in sales of the
drug. 147 FDA's failure to act to remove the drug from the market at an earlier
time had serious ramifications. In congressional testimony, Dr. David
Graham, an associate director in FDA's Office of Drug Safety, estimated that
between 88,000 and 139,000 Americans suffered a heart attack or stroke as
the result of taking Vioxx and that as many as 30% to 40% of these patients
died as a result. 148 He added that FDA should have acted much earlier by
compelling stronger warning labels, curtailing misleading advertising, and
pushing for the suspension of sales. 149 FDA's capacity to take these actions
was compromised by funding problems and a failure of political will. Its
GPRA paperwork failed to acknowledge the first problem, and it com-
pounded the second problem by emphasizing very different priorities.150
FDA's funding problems originated in 1992 with the Prescription Drug
User Fee Amendments' (PDUFA), which adopted a user-fee program to
145. Id. A "removal action" is a short-term, relatively inexpensive cleanup. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(23) (2000) ("The term includes... security fencing or other measures to limit access,
provision of alternative water supply, temporary evacuation ...and any emergency assistance
which may be provided .... ").
146. RENA STEINZOR & MARGARET CLUNE, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER
NO. 514, THE HIDDEN LESSON OF THE Vioxx FIASCO: REVIVING A HOLLOW FDA 2 (2005),
available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Vioxx-514.pdf.
147. Id. at 5.
148. FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting Safety First?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
108th Cong. 125 (statement of David J. Graham, Associate Director, Food and Drug
Administration).
149. See id. at 124-25 ("I believe such a ban [on the high-dose formulation of Vioxx] should
have been implemented.").
150. See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
151. Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379 (2000)).
Congress extended PDUFA in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-115, § 103, 111 Stat. 2296, 2299-2304 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379), and
again in the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2002, Public Health Security and
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support the agency's new-drug review program. The pharmaceutical
industry agreed to the user fees because it was frustrated with the pace of
new-drug approvals, 152 but its consent came at a steep price: PDUFA im-
posed two limitations that set the agency up for trouble down the road. First,
the legislation mandated that user fees could only be used to support FDA's
review of applications to market new prescription drugs. 153  Second, the
legislation required FDA to devote at least as much money to new-drug
reviews as it spent in 1992 (later changed to 1997), adjusted for inflation.154
These provisions caused FDA to reallocate money from other purposes to
new-drug review in order to continue the generation of fees. A report from
the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that FDA paid about $250
million in mandatory federal employee pay increases between fiscal years
1994 and 2001, but it did not receive additional funding to support these ex-
penditures from Congress, which further drained resources from existing-
drug programs. 155 By 2001, FDA's efforts to rob Peter to pay Paul allocated
about 1,000 more full-time equivalents (FTEs) to drug and biologic review
activities and 1,000 fewer FTEs to other FDA programs that "ensure
[existing] food safety, approve new medical devices such as heart valves and
pacemakers, and monitor devices once on the market."'
156
A CPR report co-authored by one of the authors of this Article found
that FDA's funding shortfalls were one of the major causes of its failure to
deal effectively with the side effects of Vioxx. 157  In 1992, the year that
PDUFA was passed, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) spent about 53% of its total budget on new-drug reviews. 58 A de-
cade later in 2002, these expenditures had risen to 74% of CDER's total
budget.' 59 That same year, the office within CDER that reviews the safety of
existing drugs received just 6% of CDER's total funding. 160 Similarly, the
office within CDER that polices deceptive drug advertising received only 1%
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 501-531, 116 Stat.
594, 687-97 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 356b, 379g-379h).
152. Barbara Ann Binzak, How Pharmacogenomics Will Impact the Federal Regulation of
Clinical Trials and the New Drug Approval Process, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 112 n.58 (2003)
(noting that the industry agreed to the fees "to improve the speed of the drug approval process").
153. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h(g)(1) (explicitly limiting the collection and availability of the user
fees to the extent provided in the Act).
154. See id. § 379h(g)(2)(A)(ii) (mandating that user fees "shall only be collected and available
to defray increases in the costs of the resources allocated for the process for the review of human
drug applications" and that relevant calculations shall be adjusted for inflation).
155. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-958, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION:
EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, WITHDRAWALS, AND OTHER AGENCY
ACTIVITIES 17 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02958.pdf.
156. Id. at 18.
157. STEINZOR & CLUNE, supra note 146, at 22.
158. Id. at2.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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of CDER's total funding.' 6' Although FDA was actively engaged in trying to
persuade Merck to feature more prominent warnings on Vioxx packaging in
the months preceding the voluntary recall, it was not sufficiently forceful in
these negotiations,' 62 either because it feared it was not ready to go to court
to force action or because it was under pressure from top-level political
appointees. 63  Vioxx was a very prominent medication with clearly
intolerable side effects by the time the company yielded to market pressures.
None of FDA's strategic plans or performance reports leading up to the
Vioxx scandal had a hint of these funding disparities. The thirty-two-page
2003 FDA Strategic Action Plan'6 4 was instead preoccupied with what the
agency could do to promote pharmacological and food-technology
developments. 165 The document worried aloud about the decreasing number
of new-drug applications received by FDA, speculating without much justifi-
cation that its own copious new-drug approval process may have been chill-
ing innovation. 166 This concern even extended onto the factory floor, with
FDA pledging to update its "Current Good Manufacturing Practices" in order
to "encourage" what it believed could be "large savings in production
costs.' 16 7 Why manufacturing efficiency should be a top priority for the only
regulatory agency charged with policing the safety and efficacy of new and
existing drugs in a period of budget shortfalls was never raised as an issue,
much less explained.
FDA's FY 2000 Performance Plan and Revised FY 1999 Performance
Plan notes the high level of injuries from adverse drug reactions,
161. Id. at 20.
162. See id. at 4 (explaining that FDA eventually yielded and allowed Merck to list the risk in
the "precautions" section of the label instead of the "warnings" section).
163. See id. at 5 (describing the impact of pressure from FDA senior management on the
conclusions and recommendations of an FDA scientist who studied Merck).
164. FDA, STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: PROTECTING AND
ADVANCING AMERICA'S HEALTH (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/mcclellan/FDA
StrategicPlan.pdf.
165. For example, a message from FDA's administrator, Mark B. McClellan, declared:
[G]etting a new drug, medical device, or food technology into use with the needed
confidence that it is safe and effective has grown harder, as new scientific
breakthroughs seem to be adding to the time, cost, and uncertainty of developing safe
and effective new products ....
... The combination of unprecedented challenges with unprecedented opportunities is
why a key element of the FDA's new strategic plan is what we call "efficient risk
management.".. . We need to make the process for developing new technology less
costly.
Id. at 4-5.
166. See id. at 11 ("Steps to reduce the time, cost, and uncertainty of developing new drugs and
devices are thus important public health priorities .... Making the process of translating new
discoveries into safe and effective treatments more efficient and quick is thus a high priority for the
FDA.").
167. Id. at 12.
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acknowledging that they were the "fourth leading cause of death in America,
behind heart disease, cancer, and stroke."'1 68 A similar entry notes the same
problem and renews the agency's commitment to develop a national critical-
event reporting system. 169 Developing a nationwide reporting system for ad-
verse reactions is certainly a worthwhile effort, but one that would not have
been the most direct way to discover and prevent the Vioxx catastrophe,
which involved side effects thoroughly documented in follow-up studies
conducted by Merck itself.170 FDA's GPRA documents omit any mention of
the relationship between PDUFA fees and the shortfalls in funding that un-
dermined the performance of the Office of Drug Safety and the Division of
Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications.
71
PDUFA came up for reauthorization last year. Had Congress failed to
extend it, user fees would have expired and an estimated 2,000 FDA employ-
ees would have lost their jobs. 72 Described as "the mother of all F.D.A.
reauthorization bills" by the agency's former general counsel Dan Troy, the
legislation redistributed PDUFA funding to avoid future inequities. 73 The
legislation was the first expansion of FDA powers in over a decade, and it is
undoubtedly a good thing that Congress managed to break its gridlock on this
occasion. But the contents of the new law were based on extreme regulatory
failure that had the worst possible outcome-thousands of premature
deaths. 1
74
With the notable exception of programs to address the "worldwide ter-
rorist threat,"'' 75 Congress has not touched the vast majority of health and
safety statutes in at least a decade, and in several cases it has been more than
two. 7 6 As we saw in the case of the Superfund, some programs depend on
crucial statutory authorities that expired years ago. It is truly demoralizing to
168. OFFICE OF PLANNING, FDA, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: FY 2000 PERFORMANCE
PLAN AND REVISED FINAL FY 1999 PERFORMANCE PLAN (1999), http://www.fda.gov/ope/FY0O
plan/intro00.htm [hereinafter FDA FY 2000 PLAN].
169. See FDA, FY 2002 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN AND SUMMARY (2001), http://www.
fda.gov ope/fy02plan/default.htm [hereinafter FDA FY 2002 PLAN].
170. STEINZOR & CLUNE, supra note 146, at 3-4.
171. See, e.g., FDA FY 2002 PLAN, supra note 169, at § 2.2 (containing no mention of PDUFA
fees in its discussion of human drugs); FDA FY 2000 PLAN, supra note 168 (containing only a
single, passing mention of PDUFA fees).
172. Gardiner Hams, House Passes Bill Giving More Power to the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2007, at A18.
173. See id. (reporting on the increase in funding to be paid by drug makers and FDA's
expanded discretion in using the funds); Drew Armstrong, Bill Clears After Intense Negotiation, CQ
WEEKLY, Sept. 24, 2007, at 2766 (reporting the increase in user fees to be paid by drug companies).
174. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2 (2000) (providing for the safeguard of public water supplies
against terrorist threats).
176. Compare, e.g., Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 401, 116 Stat. 682 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2)
(adding provisions to protect public drinking-water systems from "terrorist acts and other
intentional acts"), with 42 U.S.C. § 300h-300h-3 (containing general provisions for the protection
of underground drinking-water sources that have remained unchanged since 1986).
[Vol. 86:17411768
Capture, Accountability and Regulatory Metrics
think that only catastrophic failure and the embarrassment of massive layoffs
of government workers can prompt Congress to come to grips with the
growing reality of a regulatory state on the brink of many smaller failures.
Advocates of more effective government simply must think of a better way.
We offer positive metrics.
III. Positive Metrics
To review the bidding once again and briefly: procedural reforms
invented by the sixties reformers are no match for the problems that plague
health and safety regulatory agencies today-most prominently the crippling
effect of funding gaps. Even if public interest groups had the advantages of a
receptive judiciary and resources that matched those of industry, their goals
would be thwarted by an underfunded bureaucracy and other problems that
contribute to regulatory failure. The only solution to these dilemmas is to
refocus the public's attention on the reasons why FDA, EPA, OSHA,
NHTSA, and CPSC were created in the first place. GPRA had the potential
to produce this shift, but it has floundered as a result of its own mixed
messages.
In this Part we propose a plan for establishing positive metrics,
including the eight principles that should guide the development of such a
program; offer a prototype metric for the implementation of the Clean Water
Act's (CWA) "safety net"-the total maximum daily load (TMDL) program;
and elaborate on how the eight principles would operate.
A. A Plan for Positive Metrics
Webster's Dictionary defines "metric" as, among other things, "a
standard of measurement."' 177 "Standard" is defined as, again inter alia,
"something that is established by authority, custom, or general consent as a
model or example to be followed. 1 78 We embrace these broad definitions,
which have the advantage of including measurements of the status quo,
measurements of current and future activities and their expected results, and
measurements of normative goals within the ambit of an agency's statutory
mission.
As further defined by our proposal, positive metrics would focus on an
agency's core statutory mission or missions. For this reason, and because
positive metrics would be concise and would be made available on the World
Wide Web, they should have the potential to generate publicity and oversight
concerning why agencies have experienced regulatory failure. In isolation,
positive metrics would not indicate why an agency has failed. Instead, they
177. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1424 (3d ed. 1993).
178. Id. at 2223.
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would alert Congress, the White House, and others with oversight
authority-as well as advocacy groups, the media, and the public-that those
causes of regulatory failure must be found. Indeed, to make the best use of
positive metrics, a system of routine oversight focused specifically on im-
provements in the metrics should be created.
Positive metrics could, but do not necessarily have to, supplant GPRA.
Our position in this Article is that GPRA does not work for the purpose of
kick-starting oversight and debate concerning why an agency is failing to
achieve a statutory mission. Whether GPRA could serve as the platform for
further reform is a question we cannot easily resolve. But positive metrics
should remain uninfected by GPRA's perverse incentive structure, which
asks agencies to grade themselves by writing their own future assignments,
and then either neglects to check on whether these assignments are ever ful-
filled or kicks the agencies out of school for failing to complete those tasks.
Eight principles should guide the design of a positive metrics program:
1. Statutory Mission. Positive metrics should be aligned with an
agency's statutory mission and, if available, its more detailed
statutory mandates. 79
2. Short and Concise. Metrics should be short and concise,
focusing on an agency's core statutory mission or missions.
3. Independent Selection. An independent body of experts
familiar with the agency's work should select positive metrics.
4. Unbounded Rationality. Whether or not information is
available to answer the question behind a metric should not
have a bearing on its selection.
5. Outcomes versus Outputs. Positive metrics should emphasize
outcome, rather than output, measurements wherever possible.
6. Constant Change. Metrics should be changed as often as
possible to reflect progress and spur further advances.
7. Diagnostic. Metrics should have the potential to help diagnose
the causes of regulatory failure-including funding gaps,
technical complexity, lack of political will, inadequate statutory
design, and agency capture.
179. The statutory mandates for the five agencies we have discussed differ substantially.
Compare Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000) (spanning 270 pages), with Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000) (spanning a mere twenty-five
pages).
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8. Ready Availability. Agencies must feature positive metrics on
their Internet sites and avoid what appears to be a powerful
motivation to bury information about poor performance behind
a wall of nonobvious links requiring multiple "clicks" to reach
the desired data, thereby rendering Internet sites accessible only
to the very patient or to the already well informed.
Two additional conditions would make positive metrics more effective.
First, the entity that establishes the metrics initially should meet with each
agency at least annually to review their status. Second, EPA, which dele-
gates much of the work of implementing the law to its state counterparts,
must be given funding adequate to pay for the information-gathering that the
states would be compelled to accomplish on its behalf.
B. Prototype Metric
We chose to offer a prototype metric for the Clean Water Act (CWA)
provisions for cleaning up residual problems in the nation's surface waters,
because implementing these provisions has proven to be among the most in-
tractable problem areas for EPA-largely because the Agency must depend
on the states to accomplish the hard work of setting standards and requiring
dischargers to reduce pollution. By taking on one of the most confounding
administrative challenges faced by the agency that serves so often as a poster
child for all the others, we hope to demonstrate how positive metrics would
work to highlight regulatory failures and trigger a search for solutions.
1. Restoring Impaired Waters.-Three decades of technology-based
controls have dramatically improved the environmental status of surface
waters (rivers, lakes, streams, creeks, estuaries, etc.). But serious problems
are emerging and reemerging. Two prominent examples include toxics-
especially mercury-and pollution as a result of runoff from agricultural
operations. 18  EPA's most recent 2002 Water Quality Inventory of
"impaired" waters-those polluted to the point at which they are unfit for a
"designated use" such as drinking, swimming, or recreational boating-
indicates substantial regulatory failure. 18' EPA estimates that 45% of
assessed river and stream miles and 47% of assessed lake acres were not
180. EPA, EPA-841-R-02-001, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 2000 REPORT
(2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/2000report.
181. EPA, EPA-841-R-07-001, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, 2002 REPORTING CYCLE (2007) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 2002],
available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/2002report. The Inventory reports are required by § 305(b)
of the Clean Water Act, which is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1315 (2000).
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clean enough to support uses such as fishing and swimming.' 82  An
"assessed" water body is one that has been monitored by a state.183
The actual extent of impairment, however, is unknown for two reasons.
First, according to EPA, the states have assessed only 19% of the nation's
total river and stream miles and 37% of its lake, pond, and reservoir acres.'
8 4
Second, the statistics reported by the states are too unreliable to create a na-
tional picture of regulatory success or failure. According to a 2002 report by
GAO, 185 states use sampling methodologies that are inconsistent with each
other and, as a result, the information in EPA's database of impaired waters
is of "questionable reliability."'18 6 Because states categorize and sample wa-
ter quality inconsistently, "the numbers of impaired waters cannot be com-
pared from one state to the next and EPA cannot reliably tally the number of
TMDLs that must be completed nationwide."' 87 No one would argue that
monitoring must occur every few feet along the banks or in the middle of the
nation's great lakes, rivers, and streams. However, measuring the water
quality of a river segment that runs through agricultural lands and using those
figures to characterize problems along a ten-mile segment that runs through a
major urban area does not establish the baseline needed to tackle these im-
portant problems.
Once a "water quality segment" is listed as impaired, states must
establish a schedule for issuing total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for each
segment. TMDLs establish limits on the discharge of pollutants that are
causing the segment's impairment at the cumulative level at which water
quality will improve sufficiently to allow resumption of the segment's desig-
nated use. 189 After TMDLs are set, the states must rewrite the permits for the
pollution sources causing the problem, reducing each source's allowable
discharges. 190 States were originally required to issue TMDLs by 1979, but
none managed to do so until at least a decade later when a series of success-
ful lawsuits brought by environmental groups forced their hands. 191 Today,
most states have made only scant progress toward these goals, and it will
182. Id.
183. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (requiring states to identify impaired waters).
184. WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 2002, supra note 181, at 9 fig.1, 11 fig.2.
185. At the time, this institution was called the General Accounting Office.
186. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-186, WATER QUALITY: INCONSISTENT STATE
APPROACHES COMPLICATE NATION'S EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY ITS MOST POLLUTED WATERS 3
(2002) [hereinafter INCONSISTENT EFFORTS].
187. Id.
188. TMDL requirements are set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1).
189. Id. § 1313(d)(l)(C).
190. See id. § 1313(d)(2) (explaining the method by which states are to proceed once TMDLs
are established).
191. See generally OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW,
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 49-108 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the states' delays in
implementing these requirements and how litigation forced them to act).
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take many years before they have completed TMDLs, much less
implemented them through revised permits.
92
2. EPA GPRA Reporting.-The 2006-2011 EPA Strategic Plan does
not mention that less than a third of waters have been assessed, and it further
omits any acknowledgment of the GAO findings. Nevertheless, EPA
pledges that by 2012 it will:
[A]ttain water quality standards for all pollutants and impairments in
more than 2,250 water bodies identified in 2002 [out of 39,798 water
bodies identified by states] as not attaining standards ....
[R]emove at least 5,600 of the [69,677] specific causes of water
body impairment ....
[I]mprove water quality conditions in 250 [out of 4,800] impaired
watersheds nationwide .... 193
These goals are extraordinarily modest and suggest a pace that would
not address current, much less future, water-quality problems for a century or
more. While public interest activists can lament this lack of ambition, these
numbers alone do not communicate enough information to determine why
the pace is so slow and what could be done to accelerate it.
3. Positive Metrics.-We envision a three-year program to develop
positive metrics concerning impaired waters. The first year would involve
estimating how much it would cost and how long it would take to: (a)
synchronize federal and state data, and (b) expand monitoring to a
statistically valid sample of surface waters. The first year would also involve
creating an interactive map that shows the impaired waters for all states, the
reasons for impairment, and the schedule compiled by each state for setting
TMDLs for impaired segments.194 The schedules should show when each
state will complete the TMDLs.
In its second year, the program would require an explanation of progress
made on the synchronization and expansion of monitoring. The second year
would yield an updated interactive map consisting of the same elements as
the first-year map.
In its final year, the program would require another explanation of
progress made on synchronization and would yield another updated
interactive map. This time the map would include, on a state-by-state basis,
a schedule for implementing TMDLs by writing the limits into individual
facility permits. Beyond this three-year time horizon, we would expect the
192. Id. at 104-08.
193. EPA 2006-2011 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 142, at 43.
194. EPA has made rudimentary efforts to build this kind of tool, although most examples of
"enviromaps" on the Agency's website do not work well and are missing the layers of data we
suggest. See, e.g., EPA, EnviroMapper Storefront, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/em.
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metrics plan for each year to continue this pattern of tracking performance
and constantly raising the bar.
C. The Eight Criteria
The previous example illustrates how positive metrics can highlight
regulatory failure, but this objective is not easily achieved. As this subpart
elaborates, the eight criteria that we propose are intended to address some of
the challenges and complexities of implementing a program of positive
metrics.
1. Statutory Missions.-Positive metrics should be aligned with the
agencies' statutory mandates, including the historical record of each agency
in defining these missions. The goal is to measure the extent to which each
agency has accomplished its statutory missions and the extent to which it has
fallen short of legislatively mandated goals.
Experience with "performance-based" or "results-oriented"
management demonstrates the limited utility of elaborate metrics involving
hundreds of measures that necessarily are couched in vague, qualitative
terms. Positive metrics should therefore number no more than thirty for each
agency and should be based on quantitative data or measurements that need
empirical data to be complete. We recognize the arbitrariness of this
number; forty-five or twenty-seven metrics obviously would not violate the
spirit of our proposal. The overriding goal must be to produce metrics that
encompass the core missions of an agency.
For example, the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires EPA to identify
"criteria" air pollutants, set primary and secondary standards for each,' 95 and
oversee the development of state implementation plans that will bring air
quality into compliance with these standards-accomplishing each task un-
der strict deadlines. 96 Geographic areas that do not meet the standards are
called "non-attainment" areas. 97 An estimated ninety million Americans
live in non-attainment areas. 198 The CAA mandates suggest metrics that dis-
close the levels of criteria pollutants in the ambient air across the country and
explain how long it will take the Agency to catch up on its work.
Similarly, the purpose of OSHA is to "assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions."' 99 Ideally, positive metrics for OSHA would measure the extent
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2000) (requiring EPA to publish a list of air pollutants); id. § 7409
(requiring EPA to establish primary and secondary ambient-air-quality standards). A primary
standard protects human health, id. § 7409(b)(1), while a secondary standard is based on potential
environmental and property damage, id. § 7409(b)(2).
196. Id. § 7410.
197. Id. § 7501(2).
198. NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, SECTION 1: BACKGROUND ON AIR POLLUTION (2006), http://
www.nsc.org/ehc/mobile/acback.htm.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2000).
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to which OSHA has accomplished its mission of ensuring healthy
workplaces by identifying whether the number of workers who become ill
from workplace exposure to toxic chemicals is declining. But this second
step is out of reach for the foreseeable future due to the unavailability of reli-
able data on the incidence of workplace illnesses. A positive metric,
however, could measure OSHA's progress in regulating the number of toxic
chemicals in the workplace.2 °°
2. Short and Concise.-As noted above, experience with performance-
based or results-oriented management has shown that elaborate metrics in-
volving hundreds of vague, qualitative measures have limited utility. To ac-
complish the goal of developing short and concise metrics, the metrics
should be focused on the broad nature of the agency's statutory mission,
rather than on the means and methods of accomplishing that mission.
This goal is achievable if a distinction is made between metrics, which
measure an agency's success or failure in achieving a statutory mission, and
priority-setting, which determines individual projects, rules, or programs to
achieve that mission. For example, as discussed in the previous section,
OSHA's progress in reducing workplace illness could be measured by the
number of toxic chemicals for which it has regulations. In our scheme, it
would be left to OSHA to determine which chemicals to pursue in which
order. Nevertheless, more than one metric might be employed to measure
OSHA's progress without impinging on OSHA's prerogative to set its own
priorities. OSHA's progress might be measured by determining how many
high-volume chemicals it regulates, tracking its progress in updating older
regulations on chemical exposure, or determining the number of known tox-
ins for which OSHA has modem regulations. Indeed, all of these measures
might be appropriate.
At an agency like EPA, which has multiple statutory mandates to
implement, care should be taken not to produce dozens of metrics, which
would only deflect attention away from the accountability goal. The number
of positive metrics for large agencies with complex statutory missions should
be limited to not more than two or three dozen, in order to avoid the distrac-
tion produced by unnecessary complexity.
3. Independent Selection.-The task of compiling positive metrics
could be assigned to each of the health and safety agencies. Their
professional staffs understand their programs better and are more familiar
with their authorizing statutes than any ad hoc body of independent experts.
But inevitably, the results of such reviews would be determined by an
elaborate "log-rolling" exercise as each portion of the bureaucracy assembled
its outside constituencies to lobby for metrics that would make that unit look
200. The section that follows describes more fully how positive metrics could accomplish this.
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good. For example, FDA staff responsible for reviewing new drugs would
assemble pharmaceutical companies to ensure that fast disposition of such
applications remains a top priority, while staff responsible for reviewing the
safety and efficacy of existing drugs would press for metrics highlighting the
need for additional funding of those efforts.
Utilizing this kind of pluralistic decision making has some advantages.
For example, staff-driven efforts to define metrics are more likely to encour-
age rapid and willing compliance with reporting requirements than outsider-
driven efforts to impose metrics. The question is whether such advantages
are important enough to justify accepting the considerable downsides of an
essentially self-interested selection process. For example, to the extent that
agencies have already wandered far from their statutory missions, as was the
case in both the Superfund and Vioxx examples we gave in our discussion of
GPRA compliance,2 °1 putting an underperforming agency in charge of met-
rics selection could defeat or substantially undermine the goals of positive
metrics. We favor the establishment of independent entities to perform the
task of metric selection.
The log-rolling process that would occur if agencies were tasked with
metrics selection would invariably produce an overly lengthy and compli-
cated list of metric candidates because agencies would compromise by ac-
cepting everyone's proposed metrics. Moreover, to work properly, positive
metrics must be accessible to outsiders who are not steeped in the highly
technical details of an agency's work. While agency complexity and opacity
could also plague an independent selection committee, lack of involvement
in an agency's daily work is likely to make it far easier for those outsiders to
achieve the goal of establishing accessible positive metrics.
The independent entity assigned the task of compiling positive metrics
could be established within existing institutions: the National Academy of
Sciences, the Government Accountability Office, or individual agency in-
spectors general are all possibilities. 20 2  Alternatively, Congress and the
president could establish new independent metrics-selection entities, model-
ing them along the lines of other blue-ribbon commissions, with some mem-
bers selected by Congress, some selected by the president, and some selected
from among an agency's constituencies.20 3
Although we favor independent selection of metrics, individual agencies
should have a substantial role in advising the independent entity that chooses
the metrics. Their advice would give the independent entity the advantage of
the agency's expertise, while still protecting against the selection of the type
201. See supra subparts II(B)-(C).
202. We omit OMB because of its strong reputation as a critic of regulation, sustained across
several administrations.
203. See, e.g., Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note
(2000) (describing the process of appointments to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission,
whose members are nominated by the president and appointed by the Senate).
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of self-protective measurements that show up in the GPRA process. Indeed,
it may be efficient to have an agency propose metrics as the starting point of
the entity's process. The independent entity should also consult with or re-
ceive input from interested persons through written submissions or some type
of hearing process.
Two additional characteristics should shape the role of independent
selection entities. First, in addition to selecting the metrics, the independent
entities should routinely review and revise them as information emerges and
progress is made. Second, this entire scheme to ensure independence would
be most effective if Congress holds oversight hearings in which agencies
would answer for their performance in achieving these goals on an annual or
biannual basis.
4. Unbounded Rationality.-As in our prototype, metrics should not
depend-or be circumscribed by-the availability of information needed to
determine if they are met. Instead, agencies should understand at the outset
of the process that it may take years to accumulate the data needed to assess
their performance. If an agency lacks the information to complete a metric, it
should acknowledge this limitation and commit itself to establishing the nec-
essary information base to complete the metric. If an agency lacks the
statutory authority to obtain such information, it should acknowledge this
limitation and seek the necessary authority from Congress.
Our prototype metric illustrates the importance of unbounded
rationality. Because EPA is dependent on states to monitor the surface
waters within their jurisdictions, and because it has never established national
standards for how this work is going to be carried out, roughly 70% of sur-
face waters remain unmonitored. °4 Similarly, implementation of TMDLs-
the only statutory tool available to achieve progress in this arena-is depen-
dent on state efforts, all of which are compromised by the budget shortfalls,
lack of bureaucratic will, incompetence, and political interference that also
challenge EPA. 20 5 The troubled state of the federal-state partnership and
solutions to those intractable problems are beyond the scope of this Article,
although one of the authors has discussed them in other contexts.20 6 Suffice
204. See supra section Il(B)(I).
205. HOUCK, supra note 191, at 142-47 (describing the challenges that have confronted EPA
and the states as they try to implement these provisions).
206. See generally Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or
Reform?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,086 (2001) (explaining the causes of regulatory
failure at the state level); Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 351 (2000) (exploring the ramifications of devolving more responsibility to the states for the
protection of public health and the environment); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation Through the Government Performance and Results Act: Are the States Ready for the
Devolution?, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,074 (1999) (describing the historical battles
between EPA and the states over GPRA implementation); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded
Environmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism ": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform, 81
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it to say that these problems will pose major challenges to the
implementation of positive-metric systems.
5. Outcomes Versus Outputs.-GPRA's inventors had one overriding
claim to make about why their solution would succeed when so many other
efforts to herd the bureaucracy had failed: the statute would compel civil ser-
vants to stop "counting beans" and stand accountable for "results., 20 7 This
distinction is described in the political-science literature as the difference
between procedural accomplishments (i.e., rules written, permits issued,
enforcement actions taken) and "outcomes" (i.e., pollution reduced, accidents
avoided, dangerous drugs kept off the market). As James Q. Wilson explains
in his classic book, Bureaucracy:
First, identify a course of action.., call it the treatment. A
"treatment" can be a police tactic, a school curriculum, or a welfare
program. Second, decide what impact the treatment is intended to
have; call this the outcome. The outcome can be a crime rate, an
achievement score, a work effort, a housing condition, or an income
level.2o8
Or, as President Clinton explained in his GPRA signing statement:
It may seem amazing to say, but like many big organizations, [our
government] is primarily dominated by considerations of input, how
much money do you spend on a program, how many people do you
have on the staff, what kind of regulations and rules are going to
govern it, and much less by output, does this work, is it changing
people's lives for the better, can we say after we take money and put it
into a certain endeavor that it was worth actually having it away from
the taxpayers, into this endeavor, and their lives are better?0 9
During the decade-and-a-half since GPRA was enacted, GAO has
repeatedly acknowledged the difficulties agencies face in making this
transition. 2  Not only must agencies struggle with the deeply embedded
MINN. L. REV. 97 (1996) (tracing the states' rebellion against unfunded mandates that caused a
major erosion in the federal-state relationship).
207. Senator Roth, lead sponsor of the legislation, said in his floor statement: "The Federal
Government today is primarily process-oriented. Its focus is on following detailed procedural rules
within rigidly structured programs.... [Under GPRA, agencies will] publish annual performance
reports showing the actual outcomes." 139 CONG. REC. 17,973 (1993).
208. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
Do IT 373-74 (1989).
209. Remarks on Signing GPRA, supra note 13, at 1310-11.
210. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-38, RESULTS-ORIENTED GOVERNMENT: GPRA
HAS ESTABLISHED A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR ACHIEVING GREATER RESULTS 9 (2004), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04594t.pdf, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-44,
MANAGING FOR RESULTS: AGENCIES' ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLANS CAN HELP ADDRESS
STRATEGIC PLANNING CHALLENGES 7 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1998/gg98044.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-83, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:
REGULATORY AGENCIES IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO FOCUSING ON RESULTS 1 (1997),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97083.pdf, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
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habit of counting what they do, as opposed to what they cause to happen,
health and safety agencies must find a way to actually monitor their results in
the real world. When records are readily available, the problem boils down
to making the effort to compile it. However, when the data does not exist it
is often expensive to set up a system to generate the information, and the data
may not be obtainable in some cases.
While we recognize the importance of driving agencies to develop
outcome information, we also realize that output information may not be
available in the short term, and that input information may be a reasonable
substitute in the meantime. For example, one might seek to judge OSHA's
performance on the basis of trends in workplace fatalities, injuries, and
illnesses. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), a division of the
Department of Labor, publishes such statistics, but the data is extraordinarily
incomplete and inaccurate. 211 BLS faces a particularly daunting challenge in
developing data about occupational disease because the BLS system relies on
employers to report fatalities, injuries, and illnesses, but occupational
diseases often do not appear until workers have suffered years of exposure
and may have left employment at the facility where the exposure occurred.
Data from a non-BLS source suggests that occupational diseases cause
50,000 to 70,000 deaths annually.212
We are unsure of how long it will take to develop an alternative system
of estimating trends in occupational illnesses, or whether this even can be
done. In the meantime, a regulatory metric could be focused on outputs.
OSHA has permissible exposure limits (PELs) for only 500 chemicals, which
is a small fraction of the thousands of substances present in the American
workplace.213 Moreover, OSHA has exposure limitations for fewer than 200
GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: ANALYTIC CHALLENGES IN MEASURING
PERFORMANCE 1 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/h297138.pdf; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-97-46, PERFORMANCE BUDGETING: PAST INITIATIVES OFFER
INSIGHTS FOR GPRA IMPLEMENTATION 2 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1997/ai97046.pdf, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-118, EXECUTIVE GUIDE:
EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT 1 (1996),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 1996/gg96118.pdf, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-97-36, GPRA: MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY PILOT DID NOT
WORK AS INTENDED 3 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97036.pdf
(explaining why the GPRA managerial accountability and flexibility pilot program was
unsuccessful).
211. See, e.g., J. Paul Leigh et al., An Estimate of the U.S. Government's Undercount of
Nonfatal Occupational Injuries, 46 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 10, 10 (2004) (estimating that
BLS statistics miss between 33% and 69% of all injuries); Kenneth D. Rosenman et al., How Much
Work-Related Injury and Illness Is Missed by the Current National Surveillance System?, 48 J.
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 357, 357 (2006) (estimating that BLS statistics account for only
approximately one-third of all work-related injuries and illnesses in Michigan).
212. Phillip J. Landrigan & Dean B. Baker, The Recognition and Control of Occupational
Disease, 266 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 676, 676 (1991).
213. Is OSHA Working for Working People?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment
and Workplace Safety, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 110th Cong. 3 (2007)
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of the approximately 3,000 chemicals characterized by EPA as "high volume
production" chemicals (meaning more than a million pounds of the substance
is produced or imported each year). 14 Many of OSHA's existing emissions
limitations, which were adopted at the time that the agency was founded, are
out of date,215 and OSHA has promulgated new occupational disease regula-
tions for only about thirty substances since it was founded.216 In the last ten
years, OSHA has issued standards for a total of only two new chemicals.
217
We are also aware that both output and outcome information are
necessary to measure and assess agency activities, especially in the
enforcement arena. Deterrence-based enforcement systems often depend on
high-profile, relatively frequent prosecution of entities in all segments of an
industrial sector. Focusing on only one outcome would reward an agency for
prosecuting one large emitter because the agency could claim its action took
many tons of pollutants out of the air. In periods of acute budget shortfalls,
enforcement characterized by large one-entity prosecutions could supplant
routine enforcement against smaller entities that may, in the aggregate, emit
much larger amounts of pollution. Without the latter type of enforcement,
however, the entire sector of smaller players could fall into noncompliance.
6. Constant Change.-Static metrics would come close to being worse
than no metrics at all because they would rapidly degenerate into a rote effort
that no one could take very seriously.218 As our prototype illustrates, initial
metrics would ask agencies to take stock of the problem, admitting when
they do not have the information necessary to fully characterize the mile-
stones they must reach to achieve a statutory mission. Over time, as that in-
formation is developed, metrics should shift to an evaluation of the progress
[hereinafter OSHA Hearing] (statement of David Michaels, Research Professor, George Washington
University).
214. Id.
215. All of OSHA's other emissions limitations, called permissible exposure limits (PELs),
were adopted in 1970 based on the recommendations of private standard-setting groups, primarily
the American Conference of Governmental Industnal Hygienists (ACGIH). Many of these PELs
are out of date because ACGIH has updated their recommendations and OSHA has not been able to
update its PELs in response. OSHA's 1992 attempt to update the PELs was blocked by a court.
Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 968-69 (11 th Cir. 1992). A
second problem is that the PELs adopted in 1970 are not comprehensive standards-the regulations
are only exposure limitations and they do not provide for other employee protections, such as
requirements for employers to conduct exposure monitoring, provide medical surveillance, or
provide worker training.
216. OSHA Hearing, supra note 213, at 3.
217. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1051-.1052 (2007) (setting standards for 1,3-butadiene and
methylene chloride).
218. Experience suggests that a failure to review and revise the compliance status of any
interim goals for programs dooms such efforts to failure. See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Missing
Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air Act's VOC Emissions Reduction Program in
Nonattainment Areas, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 84-85 (1999) (arguing that EPA's failure to penalize
states that did not meet interim milestones under the Clean Air Act undercut its efforts to get them
to attain the Act's standards).
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agencies are actually making in achieving these milestones. Or, in other
words, initial metrics would be replaced by more demanding metrics that
gradually ratchet up expectations for the agency's performance.
7. Diagnostic.-The great advantage of metrics that constantly change
and are set without regard to whether information is available to satisfy them
is their potential to help overseers discover the root cause of an agency's
poor performance. Our prototype metric for implementation of the TMDL
program-the CWA's safety net for technology-based standards-would ask
EPA to estimate the resources it needs to accomplish comprehensive moni-
toring while also requiring the Agency to disclose how far the states are from
meeting the Act's overall water-quality goals. Lack of resources is at the
heart of EPA and its sister agencies' problems in this arena. Once these
shortfalls are made obvious, it would be up to Congress and the president to
decide whether to remedy them. Public interest advocates would have the
information they need to advocate for those results. This diagnostic capacity
stands in sharp contrast to the implementation of GPRA over three
presidencies. The "party line" recitations of progress that characterize GPRA
reports are useless from a diagnostic perspective.
8. Ready Availability.-Current information about agency performance
varies in its transparency. EPA, for example, offers elaborate output and
outcome data on its Web site, but the information is difficult to find. From
the EPA home page, the reader needs to click on Air in a box called Quick
Finder,219 which leads the reader to a page with the heading Air. ° The
reader then clicks on Office ofAir and Radiation, which takes the reader to a
page that contains another Quick Finder box.221 The reader then clicks on
Air Trends within the box, which takes the reader to the page named Air
Trends.2  This location gives the reader a number of options, including a
box with the heading Air Quality and Emissions-Progress Continues in
2006, which moves the reader to page with a summary of some performance
data.223 Another option is Reports and Data, which moves the reader to a
page listing reports EPA has prepared on its performance. 4 The reader can
219. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov (last updated May 16, 2008).
220. EPA, Air, http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/air.html (last updated May 16, 2008).
221. EPA, Air Trends, http://www.epa.gov/oar/airtrends (last updated Apr. 28, 2008).
222. EPA, Air Quality Status and Trends Through 2006, http://www.epa.gov/oar/airtrends/
2007/index.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2008).
223. EPA, Basic Information, Air Trends, http://www.epa.gov/oar/airtrends/sixpoll.html (last
updated May 8, 2008).
224. EPA, Reports and Data, Air Trends, http://www.epa.gov/oar/airtrends/reports.html (last
updated Apr. 28, 2008). Two of these reports contain detailed information about EPA's regulatory
successes and shortfalls. See generally, AIR QUALITY STRATEGIES AND STANDARDS Div., EPA,
EPA 454/R-03-005, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT: 2003 SPECIAL
STUDIES EDITION (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/aqtmd03 (explaining
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also click on a sidebar that leads to specific monitoring results, such as
county-by-county reports for the entire country.
225
At other agencies outcome information is available, but often only in
raw numbers. Despite the significance of data on workplace illnesses and
injuries, OSHA's Web site contains no such information,226 although there is
a jump-link to a page entitled Statistics, which contains a jump-link to BLS
Injury, Illness and Fatality Statistics.227 The BLS Web site 228 offers visitors
the opportunity to see various combinations of data, but it is not obvious how
one could use the data that is not preassembled, such as a list of workplace
fatalities from 1971 (the year OSHA was founded) to the latest year for
which statistics are available. It appears BLS intended the Web site to fa-
cilitate research by academics and others familiar with its statistical
databases-which is a good thing- but it is not the same thing as making
basic performance data easily and obviously available to the public.
Agencies should maintain separate and distinct Web pages for their
positive metrics, and agencies should clearly indicate the existence of these
pages on their home pages. Readers should be able to get to the positive-
metrics page with one click from the home page. Moreover, the metric
positive air quality trends for different criteria pollutants and regions in great detail, providing
information on all nonattainment regions, and providing summaries of selected academic studies of
policy relevance); AIR QUALITY STRATEGIES AND STANDARDS DIV., EPA, 454/K-03-001, LATEST
FINDINGS ON NATIONAL AIR QUALITY: 2002 STATUS AND TRENDS (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/aqtmd02/20O2_airtrends-final.pdf (detailing the trends towards
higher air quality for many criteria pollutants and tying these successes to various EPA regulatory
initiatives).
225. The reader must click on Air Quality Monitoring Information, a link that leads to a page
with the same name. EPA, Air Quality Monitoring Information, Air Trends, http://www.epa.gov/
air/airtrends/factbook.html (last updated Oct. 7, 2007). One of the choices on this page is Air
Quality Statistics by County, 2006, which leads to the EPA report EPA, AIR QUALITY STATISTICS
BY COUNTY (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/pdfs/ctyfactbook2006.pdf.
226. OSHA is not alone in forcing researchers to go on a treasure hunt for data. For example,
NASA recently released raw performance data in a manner that did not permit independent
researchers to interpret the data. NASA, National Aviation Operational Monitoring Service
(NAOMS) Information Release, http://www.nasa.gov/news/reports/NAOMS.html (last updated
May 13, 2008). The agency surveyed more than 25,000 pilots from 2001 to 2004, and the results
seem to suggest that flying is less safe than other statistics indicate. Thomas Claburn, NASA Report
on Air Safety Draws Criticism, INFO. WEEK, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/
secunty/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=205207258. NASA originally kept the report secret on the
grounds that its release would needlessly scare the public about the safety of flying. Id. Under
pressure from Congress, it made the results available to the public on December 30, 2007, in an
apparent attempt to deflect news coverage. Id. The released data did not enable independent
assessment. See id. (quoting Congressman Brad Miller, who complained that NASA simply
"dumped... unanalyzed data"). NASA has asked the National Academy of Sciences to review the
data, which will eventually produce an independent assessment of the data, but apparently there will
be no independent assessment of NASA's data in the meantime. See Telephone Media Briefing on
the Release of Aviation Safety Data with Michael Griffin, Administrator, NASA (Dec. 31, 2007)
(transcript available at www.nasa.gov/pdf/207317main_- NAOMSMediaTeleconTranscript.pdf).
227. OSHA Home Page, http://www.osha.gov; OSHA, Statistics & Data, http://www.osha.gov/
oshstats/index.html.
228. OSHA, Injury/Illness Incidence Rates, http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/work.html.
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information should be complete and presented in an accessible manner. No
assembly should be required.
IV. Metrics and Political Agendas
Positive metrics would offer feedback to Congress, the White House,
advocacy groups, and the media, and also would offer the public better in-
formation about regulatory outcomes. This reform would not necessarily
mean that agencies would be held more accountable for regulatory gaps and
shortfalls. But there is reason for optimism based on what we know about
the policy process.
As we have noted, positive metrics identify a problem but not its
solution. Regulatory failure has numerous causes. The goal of positive
metrics is therefore to kick-start a discussion of what went wrong. Put an-
other way, the goal is to put the problem of regulatory failure on the govern-
ment agenda. John Kingdon defines this agenda as "the list of subjects or
problems to which government officials, and people outside of the govern-
ment closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious
attention at any given time."
229
In Kingdon's model, the agenda-setting process is a function of three
relatively independent streams of activities that influence the policy process
with the assistance of advocacy groups, policy entrepreneurs, and the
media. 230 There is a "problem stream," which affects the perception and
definition of a problem; a "policy stream," which is composed of policy
experts who debate and define solutions for problems; and a "politics
stream," which reflects the political climate and public mood-both of which
are affected by the activities of advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs-
at any given time.231 A policy entrepreneur is someone who is willing to
invest time, energy, and reputation in the hope of bringing about a policy
change.232 In Congress, Henry Waxman is the iconic example of such a
policy entrepreneur.233
Kingdon focuses on the significance of "policy windows" in agenda-
setting.234 A policy window exists when there is an opportunity to make a
change in a public policy. 235 Policy windows open because of a change in
the political stream, such as "a change of administration, a shift in the
229. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 3 (1984).
230. See id. at 20-21, 61 (discussing the roles of advocacy groups, policy entrepreneurs, and
the media as "agenda setters").
231. Id. at 20-21.
232. Id. at 129-31.
233. See Karen Tumulty, The Scariest Guy in Town, TIME, Dec. 4, 2006, at 47, 47 available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1562974,00.html (describing Waxman's
legislative successes).
234. KINGDON, supra note 229, at 174-76.
235. Id. at 94.
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partisan or ideological distribution of seats in Congress, or a shift in the
national mood," or "because a new problem captures the attention of gov-
ernment officials and those close to them., 236 When a policy window opens,
a problem moves from the government agenda to the decision agenda.237 A
matter on the decision agenda is in position for a legislative enactment, a de-
238cision by the President, or action by an agency administrator.
Positive metrics can promote agenda setting in two ways. First, positive
metrics would flow into the "problem stream," elevating the perception that
regulatory failure is a significant and important national problem that de-
serves the attention of government officials and those around them. Second,
positive metrics would assist government officials, advocacy groups, policy
entrepreneurs, and others in the political stream to move the issue of regula-
tory failure to the decision agenda. As Kingdon warns, the position of an
issue or item on the decision agenda will be fleeting if a problem cannot be
found.239
Positive metrics should assist consumer and environmental advocacy
groups to hold agencies accountable despite the fact that these groups have
fewer resources than their business counterparts. 240  The communication of
policy problems is an important aspect of interest group activity.241 At the
present time, consumer and environmental groups, for the most part, must
create the metrics for themselves and also communicate them in the political
242stream. Even the EPA Web site, which contains ample information about
regulatory gaps and shortfalls concerning the CAA, does not create the type
of accessible and obvious metrics that we seek. By reducing this burden,
positive metrics will assist advocacy groups in making the case for regulatory
ineffectiveness, and thereby make it more likely that such problems will be
recognized in the agenda-setting process.
236. Id. at 176.
237. See id. at 174-75 (explaining that the decision agenda is composed of a small subset of
issues on the government agenda that are ripe for legislative or executive action, and noting that the
opening of a policy window is a key opportunity to obtain such legislative or executive action).
238. Id. at 175-76.
239. Id. at 187.
240. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
241. See Michael E. Kraft & Diana Wuertz, Environmental Advocacy in the Corridors of
Government, in THE SYMBOLIC EARTH: DISCOURSE & OUR CREATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 95,
97 (James G. Cantrill & Christine L. Oravec eds., 1996) (observing that the "communications
strategies of environmental organizations are tied intimately to the larger process of agenda setting
and policy change").
242. See generally, e.g., DIANE BAILEY ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HARBORING
POLLUTION: THE DIRTY TRUTH ABOUT U.S. PORTS (2004), available at http://environment
now.org/pdf/cca-reports-harboring-pollution-the-dirty-truth-about-US-ports.pdf (documenting the
failure to effectively reduce air and water pollution in and near U.S. ports); James Parks, Millions of
Workers Lack Even Most Basic Safety Protections, AFL-CIO NOW BLOG: NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007,
http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/04/26/millions-of-workers-lack-even-most-basic-safety-protections
(noting the undercounting of injuries and illnesses by BLA and linking that undercounting to lack of
effective regulation).
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V. Conclusion
Shortly before this Article went to press, the United States Supreme
Court decided Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,243 an opinion with far-reaching
implications for the future of health and safety regulation. Holding that the
Medical Device Amendments to the Food and Drug Act preempted state
common law, 24 4 the Court raised the stakes for an effective FDA sky-high.
Unless Congress reverses this misguided decision, any careless, poorly
documented, or simply mistaken conclusion by the government's scientific
experts will leave severely injured consumers without any recourse in the
courts. Just as unfortunately, the indirect message of the opinion is that
manufacturers of medical devices, and potentially thousands of other
products, are wise to invest significant resources in lobbying to influence the
outcome of regulatory decisions because success will also provide tort
immunity. Agencies will need to be quite sturdy to withstand such newly in-
vigorated campaigns.
Placing such an enormous burden on the shoulders of a fragile
bureaucracy emphasizes as few other developments could the timeliness, and
indeed the urgency, of the reforms we advocate here. Positive metrics should
prepare the way for effective oversight, provide an early warning of im-
pending regulatory failure, and prompt a diligent search for solutions that
will rehabilitate the regulatory safety net. In a system of justice that narrows
the remedies available to injured consumers down to effective prevention,
these steps seem like the least we can do.
243. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
244. Id. at 1001.
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